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Preface 
This paper discusses various aspects of the problems African governments face 
in financing their generally large budgetary deficits. Its primary objectives are to 
focus on the main methods of financing which are realistically available given 
the generally thin financial markets in Africa, and to identify the reasons why 
each of these methods imposes clear limits on how much funding a government 
can raise without imposing high costs on its country 's economic progress. It is 
not the purpose of the paper to explore the reasons why African budgetary 
deficits stand at such high levels, although two particular matters of relevance to 
this question, namely the influences of financial sector insolvency and the ef-
fects of adjustment programmes, are considered in some detail. In general we 
are not trying to make judgements about whether it is bad policies, bad luck or 
some combination of these which account for the high deficits. Nor is it the pur-
pose of the paper to judge either the possible excesses of public expenditure or 
the possible inadequacies of the revenue-raising efforts. Rather, by focusing on 
the problems posed for economic management by the financing of large deficits, 
it attempts to suggest certain technical economic reasons why African govern-
ments often do need to restrain their own deficits, however caused, as part of a 
sound package of adjustment measures. 
This somewhat back-to-front , and possibly unconvent ional approach, is 
adopted in order to identify a relatively wide range of substantially under-re-
searched issues which individual African countries need to address if they are to 
have a clearer view of the realistic limits on public deficits, and how these 
deficits might be better managed. The presumption here is that while political 
judgements are necessarily invoked in debate about public expenditure and tax-
ation policies in poor countries, there is a need for more and better research on 
some issues to filter out the genuinely political issues from the largely technical 
ones. If, to take a simple example, there is some rate for the inflation tax beyond 
which public revenues f rom that tax would actually decline, it is important to 
know why and what the critical rate might be. Armed with that knowledge, it is 
possible to perceive that reductions in public expenditures, designed to help 
curtail the use of the inflation tax, are not always and inevitably a threat to living 
standards or the level of provision of public goods. On the contrary, they may 
defend these. Furthermore, while the issues and techniques associated with 
taxation are well known and well documented, those associated with the financ-
ing of deficits are relatively little explored, either conceptually or empirically: 
like the deficit itself they are often treated as a matter of only residual interest. 
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There is little in this paper which can claim to be original other than the 
bringing together of a relatively wide range of issues in an attempt to define a 
research agenda for interested African scholars. In order to interrupt the flow of 
the paper as little as possible, indications about possible research questions are 
listed separately as Research Issues at the end of the paper. Following further 
discussion with interested parties, it is proposed that these issues be packaged 
together to form a number of research projects for implementation either in in-
dividual African countries or, on a comparative basis, in several countries at the 
same time. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section I briefly describes the trends 
and prevailing magnitudes of fiscal deficits in Africa, and provides some dis-
cussion of the main components of these deficits and the ways in which they re-
late to Afr ica 's external debt problem. This discussion is supported by brief de-
scriptions of the situation in selected African countries for which appropriate 
data are available. A separate Appendix elaborates this more fully for 13 coun-
tries. Section II attempts to describe the main financing mechanisms which are 
realistically available to the typical African government, and briefly notes some 
of the advantages and disadvantages of each of these. Section III utilizes some 
relatively simple theory to show in more detail why there are limits on each of 
the main methods of budgetary finance, namely domestic borrowing, external 
borrowing and inflationary finance. Sections IV and V look at two issues which 
currently impinge very severely on the fiscal and deficit-financing problems of 
many African countries. The first of these, which is covered in Section IV, is the 
important but grossly neglected issue of the impact of banking-sector crisis and 
insolvency on fiscal deficits and their financing. Section V acknowledges that 
the magnitude of fiscal deficits, as well as the problems associated with their fi-
nancing, will both be affected by some of the adjustment policies which African 
countries are increasingly urged to adopt. Discussion in Section V concentrates 
on just two such policies, namely the more active use of the exchange rate and 
interest-rate reform. Finally, Section VI explores some of the tax and other rea-
sons which discourage saving in Africa and, in particular, the impediments in 
the way of the emergence of capital markets f rom which African governments 
could, in principle, extract significantly more voluntary f inancing of their 
deficits than they currently achieve. 
I. introduction 
The first nine years of the 1980s saw a generally worsening situation for fiscal 
balance in the developing countries as a whole, with the overall deficit rising 
f rom the equivalent of 1.5 percent of G D P in 1980 to a peak of 6 percent in 
1987, after which it declined slightly. In Africa, the situation has been persis-
tently worse than the developing country average. In 1980, the average fiscal 
deficit in Africa was equivalent to 4.7 percent of GDP; it rose to a peak of 8 per-
cent in 1987, but even in 1988 it remained well in excess of 7 percent (IMF, 
1988). This major and continuing financing gap creates a variety of serious 
problems for economic management, several of which are analysed in depth in 
later sections of this paper. 
The persistently high deficits are the result both of policies, which in the 
1980s have sought to moderate expenditures while increasing revenues, and ex-
ogenous circumstances which have worked to make the fiscal situation worse. 
As regards the first of these, a recent World Bank/UNDP report (World Bank 
and UNDP, 1989) has noted that, since 1980, at least 29 Sub-Saharan African 
(SSA) countries have had fiscal adjustment programmes, most of which in-
cluded efforts to improve fiscal balance. Most of these have combined efforts to 
reduce spending, and especially wages and salaries,1 and to increase revenues. In 
the period 1980-1984, for example, 26 of the 27 SSA countries operating IMF-
supported adjustment programmes were targeting a reduced ratio of government 
expenditure to G D P as a part of that programme. Many programmes also incor-
porated restraints on non-wage recurrent expenditures such as subsidies, as well 
as on public investment outlays. As regards exogenous circumstances, the two 
most important have been the sharp, 30 percent on average, decline in the SSA 
terms of trade since 1981 and the higher interest charges on debt caused by 
higher interest rates and, in the case of a few countries only, increased depen-
dence on non-concessional loans. The terms-of-trade story is a relatively com-
plex one which has affected the five middle-income oil-exporting countries of 
Afr ica 2 rather differently than the poorer IDA countries. However, its general 
fiscal effect has been to render more difficult the revenue raising aspirations of 
the countries concerned (see Research Issue No. 1). Thus, notwithstanding the 
efforts in this direction already referred to, fiscal revenues relative to G D P have 
either fallen or stagnated in both the SSA area and in Africa more generally.3 
Interest payments are also an extremely important part of the explanation of ris-
ing deficits because they are the only major component of government spending 
which has seen a large increase in its share of total spending—from about 5 per-
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cent in 1980-1983 to some 14 percent by 1986-1987. 
In short, despite prodigious efforts and considerable political courage in some 
cases, African governments generally have not succeeded in bringing deficits 
down to manageable, or easily financeable, levels. Revenues, as already noted, 
have declined slightly relative to GDP and total expenditures have remained 
stubbornly at around 31 percent of GDP. The financing problems associated 
with fiscal deficits averaging around 8 percent of GDP are further complicated 
by the quasi-fiscal deficits arising from the activities of public enterprises. The 
1989 World Bank/UNDP report already referred to (World Bank and UNDP, 
1989), notes that an amount equivalent to 1 percent of GDP (or about 14 percent 
of the fiscal deficit narrowly defined) can be ascribed to the financing of the 
losses of public enterprises. In addition, the 3,000 or so public enterprises oper-
ating in SSA account, on average, for at least 15 percent of domestic and exter-
nal borrowings. Such borrowing has many of the same consequences that are as-
sociated with government financing of its own deficits. Furthermore, in many 
African countries the dividing line between the two types of financing operation 
is blurred because, for example, the loans in question are guaranteed by gov-
ernment, ultimately assumed as liabilities of the government, or used for projects 
which are viable, if at all, only in social and not financial terms (see Research 
Issue No. 2). 
Equally blurred, but again a net addition to the totality of the public-sector fi-
nancing problems of many African countries, are the rediscounts and guarantees 
of private-sector loans made available by central banks. These will normally be 
financed via monetary/inflation mechanisms, but do not necessarily show up in 
fiscal deficits as such. However, by pre-empting part of one of the main financ-
ing mechanisms available to government, they make the financing of the fiscal 
deficit, narrowly defined, that much more difficult (see Research Issue No. 3). 
The severe and persistent public-sector financing problem in Africa has a 
clear and obvious connect ion to its external f inance and debt problems. 
Although the absolute size of Sub-Sahara Afr ica 's external debt, at some $130 
billion, does not pose the same problems for global economic stability as does 
that of the major Latin American debtors, it has many particular features which 
condition future economic prospects. First, the SSA debt has grown more 
rapidly over the last decade than that of any other region and, as a consequence, 
the main debt indicators are now worse than for most other parts of the world. 
The SSA debt-to-GNP ratio, for example, has risen f rom 21 percent in 1975 and 
28 percent in 1980 to something in excess of 100 percent at the present time. At 
the same time, the debt-to-exports ratio averages more than 350 percent, while 
debt-service obligations, not all of which are met on the terms originally agreed, 
are equivalent to over 36 percent of export earnings as compared to less than 10 
percent in 1975 (World Bank and UNDP, 1989). Furthermore, the ratio for the 
poorer IDA countries is substantially higher than this average with almost 50 
percent of export earnings being notionally obligated to debt service in 1987.4 
The major link between the public finances and external debt is the fact that 
official development assistance—always the largest part of the SSA debt—has 
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been growing faster than all other financial flows, to the point that in 1986/87 it 
accounted for about 90 percent of all net f lows. The story of the 1980s has 
largely been one of a rapid decline in the nominal value of private net f lows, 
especially to 1984, matched by a rise in net ODA disbursements which has been 
considerably more rapid than that received by other regions of the world. Gross 
disbursements of private long-term lending in SSA, which in any case is concen-
trated on only a handful of middle-income countries, amounted to only $3.3 bil-
lion in 1986-1987. However, since this represents a considerably lower figure 
than in the past, and was matched by a large debt-servicing obligation, the situa-
tion in recent years has been one of significant, albeit declining, transfers back to 
private lenders f rom SSA countries. Thus, to the extent that African govern-
ments draw on external grants and loans to f inance their own activities, they 
have become dependent, with few exceptions, exclusively on official sources. 
Furthermore, the external funding of fiscal deficits has been affected by two 
further points. First, governments have either explicitly or implicitly guaranteed 
some of the loans of their private sectors, and so some part of the negative net 
transfer associated with these loans is finding its way into the total of fiscal or 
quasi-fiscal deficits (see Research Issue No. 4). Second, the real interest rates on 
non-concessional debt (defined by reference to the region 's index of export 
prices), has averaged well over 10 percent per annum through the 1980s.5 On the 
more positive side, the average grant element of long-term loan commitments 
increased f rom less than 20 percent in 1981/82 to over 50 percent by 1987. 
Although the numerous debt reschedulings in the region have often resulted in 
some increase in non-concessional loans, the overall outcome has been such that 
only 15 percent of new loan commitments in 1987 were made on non-conces-
sional terms as compared to 50 percent or more some four years earlier. 
The deficit situation in individual countries 
Against the broad trends just discussed, it is useful to look briefly at the deficit 
situations in a few selected African countries and to consider how these have 
been financed during the 15 years since 1974. For this purpose, information on 
13 countries for which comparable data were available in Government Finance 
Statistics were analysed, and the results are presented in the Appendix. Here we 
merely look at the main features in seven of these countries. 
Botswana 
Of the 13 countries examined, Botswana is clearly an exception in so much as its 
fiscal position has been in surplus since 1982. Indeed by 1985, the surplus had 
reached 25 percent of GDP. Clearly deficit financing has not been an issue. 
However, for the remaining 12 countries, deficits have often been very substan-
tial and have given rise to a varied and changing structure of financing. Several 
countries have had low access to external funding because of their political 
s tanding in the world, or because of poor economic pol icies , or both. 
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Occasionally this has been amended as "successful" adjustment programmes 
have been put in place. Ghana is a good example. Other countries not enjoying 
good access to external financing of public deficits have included Sierre Leone, 
Uganda, Zaire and Zambia. Zimbabwe has fared much better in this regard. For 
most of the countries considered below, the story is one of high deficits financed 
in varying proportions by official financing f rom abroad or by borrowing from 
the domestic monetary authorities. 
Ghana 
In Ghana, f inancing requirements, after reaching 9.5 percent of GDP in 1977, 
fell to 4.2 percent in 1980 as both revenues and expenditures relative to GDP 
declined with the general demise of formal economic activity. Compared to 
African averages, Ghana ' s deficit has been modest, but only because of the 
unusual situation confronting that economy. Throughout the 1970s, domestic 
sources of financing were prevalent, with the monetary authority normally sup-
plying 60 perent or more of total financing. However, as the adjustment pro-
grammes began in 1983, external sources of funds became far more important 
and by 1985 they had come to finance about 46 percent of the deficit. Much of 
this was short- and medium-term financing on a concessional basis. During the 
same period, the relative importance of financing from the domestic monetary 
authorities declined significantly. 
Sierre Leone 
In Sierre Leone, the central government deficit rose to 15.3 percent of GDP by 
1980, and subsequently has normally exceeded 7 percent of GDP. In 1974, the 
external financing contribution to the deficit amounted to 62 percent of the total, 
but this has subsequently declined and between 1979 and 1984 was never 
greater than 32 percent of the total. Within the large total of domestic financing, 
the monetary authorities have been easily the most important contributor with 
between 79 and 84 percent of the total in the period from 1981 to 1983. That has 
lessened somewhat in subsequent years. 
Uganda 
In the case of Uganda, a high deficit equivalent to 9.5 percent of GDP in 1974 
declined significantly in the next few years for reasons of economic decline 
comparable to those experienced in Ghana. Domestic sources were easily the 
most important contributor to the financing in most of the years of the Amin 
government, and in several subsequent years as well. This was a natural conse-
quence of the extremely poor expenditure controls, wholly inadequate revenue 
efforts and Uganda 's extremely poor access to external funds. As circumstances 
normalized somewhat in 1984 and 1985, external funding expanded to meet, for 
example, 21 percent of total requirements in 1985. However, both the absolute 
and proportionate dependence of domestic monetary financing remained high. 
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Zaire 
Zaire's deficit of 17.6 percent of GDP in 1974 was high even by African stan-
dards, and was certainly high for that period. In that year, external f inancing 
supplied 36.5 percent of requirements as compared to about 60 percent from the 
domestic monetary authorities. However, deficits were reduced sharply by the 
late 1970s, and by the mid-1980s Zaire had achieved a budgetary surplus. The 
access to external financing declined during that same period, and in 1982, for 
example, provided only about 7 percent of total financing as compared with over 
93 percent f rom the monetary authorities. Although published data thereafter are 
poor, it appears that the dependence on monetary financing became even higher. 
Zambia 
In the case of Zambia, a small budgetary surplus in 1974 has given way to gen-
erally large deficits in recent years: in the range of 8 -18 .3 percent of GDP in the 
early 1980s, for example. In many years, Zambia has been able to obtain sub-
stantial funding f rom international development institutions and foreign gov-
ernments. In 1983, 1984 and 1985, for example, these sources accounted for 
109.5 percent, 97.8 percent, and 97.2, percent, respectively, of the total deficit 
financing. However, when domestic financing has been required this has mostly 
come f rom the monetary authorities. In 1981 and 1982, for example, this ac-
counted for 64 and 54 percent of the respective totals. 
Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe provides an interesting contrast to Zambia in so much as a large part 
of its external f inancing comes f rom "other non-off ic ia l sources". Overall 
deficits have fluctuated in the range of 5 - 1 1 percent of G D P during the period. 
Following the political settlement in 1980, external financing has made a signifi-
cant contribution amounting to 21 percent, 56 percent and 24 percent in 1980, 
1981 and 1982, respectively. Later on, such contributions became even more 
important, rising to the equivalent of 50 percent and 83 percent of requirements, 
respectively, in 1984 and 1985. A substantial part of these transfers was f rom 
"non-official" sources. Although the contributions f rom the monetary authorities 
appear to have been fairly modest in the 1970s, they expanded thereafter to meet 
29 percent and 44 percent of requirements in 1981 and 1982, respectively. 
II. An overview of financing methods 
In this section we look first at the possible methods available to African gov-
ernments for financing their generally large deficits. Then we explore some of 
the macroeconomic consequences of the various methods: an issue elaborated in 
greater detail in Section III. 
Standard textbooks on financial/monetary issues typically refer to three main 
methods of deficit finance, namely: 
(a) Finance through money creation ("inflationary" financing); 
(b) Finance through sales of government securities ("non-inflationary domestic 
financing"); and 
(c) Finance through external borrowing ("non-inflationary" external financ-
ing"). 
Method (a) is differentiated from (b) and (c) in that it does not lead to any in-
crease in a stock of debt, and in this sense is analogous to conventional taxation. 
Hence, the label "inflation tax" is often attached to this form of financing. By 
contrast, since the debt incurred by government if it chooses to finance deficits 
through methods (b) and (c) will carry interest charges, the net contribution of 
such financing to long-term deficit financing is less than the gross contribution. 
Hence, the eventual consequence of dependence on these methods may be a 
need for a rise in conventional or inflation tax revenues. For this reason, the la-
bel "non-inflationary", which is sometimes attached to these two methods of fi-
nancing, is misleading. There are several mechanisms, some of which are dis-
cussed in Section III, through which an excessive dependence on such methods 
will certainly boost inflation rates. 
This proposition becomes clearer if we note that textbook analysis often as-
sumes that domestic sales of government securities are normally organized on a 
voluntary basis in markets where prices and interest rates on such securities are 
freely determined by the forces of supply and demand. In practice, this is rarely 
the case in developing countries, and it is certainly not the norm in Africa for 
two main reasons. First, with some important exceptions such as Nigeria, 
Zimbabwe, Kenya and Cote d ' lvoire, African capital markets are embryonic or 
non-existent and certainly do not provide the basis for the voluntary absorption 
of more than a small part of the debt which governments need to float to cover 
deficits. Second, the majority of African governments maintain extremely strong 
administrative controls on interest rates (often for reasons linked to their large 
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deficits), and certainly do not allow the free movement of rates that would be the 
necessary incentive to voluntarily sell the large volumes of debt issues required 
(Hansen and Neal, 1984). Thus, for all practical puiposes, and in most of the 
discussion below, it can be assumed that voluntary sales of securities make no 
contribution to the problem of financing deficits (see Research Issue No. 5). 
What is really involved in relation to financing method (b), above, is a variety 
of compulsory mechanisms whereby governments in Afr ica place their debt. 
Because such mechanisms invariably involve interest rates below market levels, 
the increase in debt which they also involve can be regarded as a mixture of tax-
ation and debt accumulation in a true sense. There are essentially five sub-divi-
sions of method (b) which are important in developing countries, including those 
in Africa. 
Methods of finance through sales of government securities 
/. Reserve requirements on banks and other financial institutions 
This is a straightforward financing mechanism as far as the government is con-
cerned. Since interest rates paid on required reserves are normally set at zero, or 
well below "market" interest rates, the tax element involved is large. It is, 
therefore, a method which can be highly distortionary in that, for a given profit 
target in the banks, it requires the banks to maintain a far larger margin between 
deposit and lending rates than would otherwise be necessary. A deposit interest 
rate of, for example, 10 percent with a required reserve ratio of 40 percent would 
require a bank lending rate of almost 17 percent even before allowing for the 
banks ' administrative and other costs (i.e. 17 percent on loans of 60 units is 
equivalent in revenue terms to 10 percent on loans of 100 units). Given that the 
demands for bank credits are sensitive to interest rates, loan demand is depressed 
by this method, as too is the demand of the banks for new deposit to on-lend. In 
short, the consequence of a high reserve requirement is the contraction of the fi-
nancial system, which means, above all, that the tax base on which the reserve 
requirements tax can be levied is progressively reduced.6 
2 Required purchase of government bonds by banks at con-
trolled interest rates 
This has exactly analogous consequences to the required reserves already dis-
cussed, with the one exception that the interest rate paid on bonds is normally 
greater than zero although less than the market rate. Thus, the tax element of this 
method, and its distortionary consequences, will be less than in the previous 
case. The important point about the control on interest rates is that if the gov-
ernment is also using inflationary methods of finance (method a), the real burden 
of government debt is reduced as inflation takes its course without there needing 
to be any compensation to savers in the form of higher nominal interest rates. 
However, in a highly inflationary situation, the distortion is large, and any 
8 SPECIAL PAPER 4 
suggestion that this is a sound basis on which to stimulate the development of 
capital markets is fallacious in the extreme. 
3. Required purchases of government bonds by banks at market 
interest rates 
This approach will not involve any tax element and nor will it have the distor-
tionary consequences associated with the other two approaches. However, with 
inflation rates in Africa generally high and rising through the 1980s, it has not 
normally proved possible for African governments to accept the extremely high 
nominal interest rates on bonds which this approach would require. In addition, 
if expectations of higher future inflation are well established (which is not un-
reasonable when deficits are high and rising), this approach may well require 
highly positive real interest rates in excess of rates of economic growth and re-
turns on public-spending projects. Thus, in a high-deficit , high-inflation envi-
ronment this approach to deficit financing is a recipe for an unstable/explosive 
growth of the government 's financing gap. 
4. Credit rationing in the presence of controlled interest rates 
Where credit is rationed but banks are not permitted to fix deposit interest rates 
so as to balance deposit and credit growth, an unlent surplus of funds in the 
banks is an inevitable consequence. Governments are able to capture this for 
their own financing purposes through a variety of measures, including the issue 
of special securities carrying below-market interest rates. The distortionary ef-
fects are analogous to those under 2, above, except that those in the private sec-
tor who come out well f rom the credit rationing process gain will, in effect, 
share the tax revenues associated with artificially low interest rates with the 
government. 
5. Arrears of government payments 
Many African governments, in common with governments elsewhere in the de-
veloping world, have spent large parts of the 1980s in a state of severe liquidity 
constraints, if not insolvency. Uganda and Ghana are two of the more obvious 
examples. In this situation, the failure to pay outstanding obligations, either to 
employees or to the suppliers of goods and services, appears, on the basis of ca-
sual evidence, to have become an important source of government financing. 
This "borrowing f rom suppliers", or "arrears", is obviously an extremely unsat-
isfactory basis for financing the government for several reasons. It is clearly an 
involuntary form of financing as far as the lender is concerned and, since it is 
unlikely to involve any interest payment on outstanding balances, the tax ele-
ment is a large part of the total. However, unlike some of the other methods de-
scribed above, its distortionary effects do not involve any discouragement to the 
holding of monetary and other financial assets and so a discouragement to the 
growth of the financial sector. However, it will be distortionary in so far as the 
government 's example is almost certain to lead to a general collapse of respect 
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for the law of contract and to a pervasive failure of private economic agents to 
make the payments required of them. In particular, since most suppliers of the 
government are also taxpayers, the rate of collection of tax revenues may well 
suffer in a very direct manner (see Research Issue No. 6).7 
Taking account of these various points, it is perfectly realistic in an African 
context to recast the three main sources of government financing listed on page 
6 as: 
(a) Finance through money creation ("inflationary finance"); 
(b) Involuntary domestic lending to government through the various channels 
just listed; 
(c) Finance through external borrowing (see Research Issue No.7). 
Direct and indirect sources of funds to government 
The next point to note is that the connection between the direct source of the 
government 's financing and the real balance of deficit f inancing as between do-
mestic and external source is a tenuous one. This follows f rom the familiar na-
tional accounting identity, namely that: 
(1) S f = (Ig - Sg) + (Ip - Sp) 
where the subscripts g and p indicate government and private, respectively. 
Let us assume that the investment schedule of both the private and public 
sectors shows some negative response to the real interest rate, while the savings 
supply, both f rom domestic savers and from abroad, is positively responsive to 
real interest rates. Then either an increase in I g or a reduction in S g will raise the 
equilibrium interest rates at which total domestic investment is financed. Low 
interest elasticities and the absence of administrative controls will certainly im-
ply larger movements of interest rates in this situation than will high elasticities, 
but the direction of interest-rate movement is unambiguous. Thus, for example, 
if the whole of an increase in government expenditure is f inanced through for-
eign borrowing, the higher cost of such funds at the margin will divert some 
foreign borrowing away from the private sector. Equally, higher direct govern-
ment borrowing from domestic sources will drive some private-sector borrowers 
into a greater dependence on foreign loans (see Research Issue No. 8). Since the 
counterpart of the higher total overseas borrowing in both these cases is a wors-
ened current account balance of payments deficit, it is also clear that this deterio-
ration can occur independently of the method the government chooses to directly 
finance its own enhanced deficit. Some recent estimates for developing countries 
in general have suggested that about 75 percent of any increase in budgetary 
deficits feed through into the current external account, irrespective of the 
method of f inance chosen (Balassa, 1988). In short, enlarged government 
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deficits either result directly in increased external borrowing, or they force the 
private sector into increased borrowing from that source. 
The final point to note in this context is that the substitutability of domestic 
and foreign sources of financing, implicit in the discussions of the previous 
paragraphs, will apply only while levels of accumulated external debt are below 
the point at which further increments to such debt begin to generate a penal risk 
premium element in the interest rate which is charged. When this point is 
passed, the whole of any increase in a government 's deficit is likely to fall on 
domestic saving, and so directly crowd out private expenditures. 
III. Inflation, fiscal deficits and 
debt management 
It is possible to examine the economic consequences of the three possible meth-
ods of financing described in the previous section, and their interconnection, in a 
number of ways. We will focus on four main issues, namely the limits of infla-
tionary finance; the limits on external funding; the trade-offs between inflation-
ary finance and involuntary funding from domestic savings; and the trade-off 
between inflationary financing and external debt. 
The limits of inflationary finance 
As already noted, the financing of government revenues through money cre-
a t ion 8 has all the main properties of. conventional taxation. In particular, it 
avoids the creation of a stock of debt; and it distorts economic activity by dis-
couraging the use of the item, namely the services of money balances, on which 
the tax is levied. Although hard-stretched governments, and especially those 
which have lost access to external borrowing, find it all too easy to expand re-
liance on money creation, it is analytically well established that the revenue 
gains f rom this approach are strictly limited. This is evident f rom the simple and 
familiar model presented in Fry (1988). Specifically, if the net foreign as-
sets/liabilities of a country are ignored, the consolidated balance sheet of its 
banking sector is given by: 
(2) DCP + DC g = M 
where DC = domestic credit 
M = money supply 
(3) and DCp/PY + DCg/PY = M/PY 
where PY is the nominal value of G D P 
If the demand for real money balances is a negative function of the inflation 
rate (71) as, for example, in the equation 
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(4) Md/P = 0 e - dn 
and if we suppose that all the revenue from the inflationary tax accrues to the 
government, then in any given year those revenues (R) in real terms are given 
by: 
(5) R/P = i c . ( 0 e - d n ) 
where 0 and 3 are numerical parameters. 
Solving this last equation for different values of the rate of inflation and two 
alternative values of the numerical parameters, 0 and 3, shows alternative opti-
mal rates of inflation (indicated by*), beyond which revenues will decline (see 
Table 1) (Van Wijnbergen 1988). The second set of simulations in Table 1 is for 
the case where money demand is relatively insensitive to higher inflation. 
Table 1 Inflation tax revenues and the rate of the inflation tax 
Inflation Revenues Revenues 
rate (%) ( 0 = 3 = 5) ( 0 = 7 . 5 , 3 = 2.5) 
2.5 0.11 0.18 
5.0 0.19 0.33 
10.0 0.30 0.58 
15.0 0.35 0.77 
20.0 0.37* 0.91 
30.0 0.33 1.06 
40.0 0.27 1.10* 
50.0 0.21 1.07 
60.0 0.15 1.00 
70.0 0.11 0.99 
80.0 0.07 0.81 
90.0 0.05 0.71 
100.0 0.03 0.62 
* The point at which the rise in revenues in response to higher inflation ceases (i.e. the 
optimal point) 
Using a slightly more complex version of this same model, the parameters of 
which are given later, Fry suggests that the maximum deficit which can be fi-
nanced through inflation is about 7.7 per cent of GNP, implying an inflation rate 
of some 46 percent (see Research Issue No. 9). However, this "optimal" infla-
tion rate is optimal in only a very partial sense and there is little dispute that the 
inflation rate to be targeted by any responsible government is very substantially 
lower than the maximum implied by such models. There are several reasons for 
asserting this. First, high inflation (i.e. beyond 20-30 percent) almost always 
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involves more volatility of inflation and enhanced uncertainty, which, in turn, 
implies lower investment. Second, higher inflation may well reduce the real rev-
enues f rom conventional taxation because of lags in collection, and may also 
enlarge government deficits if, as is likely, expenditures are more inflation-proof 
than revenues.9 Taking account merely of lags in collection, Tanzi (1988) has 
simulated results which suggest, for example, that a rise in inflation f rom zero to 
50 percent could reduce the revenue:GDP ratio of 20 percent to less than 16 per-
cent, which would almost match the rise in the inflation tax revenues. Third, and 
most important, high rates of inflation, while they may be visible to all, will in-
volve a differential ability to respond in different segments of society. Hence, 
arbitrary, unplanned and probably large redistributions of income incentives are 
the inevitable result of high inflation. While it could conceivably be the case that 
aggregate saving might be enhanced as a by-product of this redistribution, most 
of the evidence suggests that it retards economic growth (Thirlwall, 1974). 
The analysis stemming from the logic of equation (5) illustrates why a gov-
ernment, purely for narrow revenue-raising reasons, should wish to restrict its 
use of inflationary financing. However, there are other policies commonly used 
in Africa and other developing countries which can shift the Md funct ion 
downwards and so raise the inflation rate required to meet any given size of the 
deficit. For example, taxes and ceilings on interest rates are likely to operate so 
as to reduce money demand for any given combination of income, prices and in-
flation. Similarly, policies such as the selective direction of credit may result in 
the sub-optimal use of bank resources, in lower volumes of credit in total, and so 
in a reduced mobilization of deposit balances through the banking system. In 
short, one class of financial sector policies, introduced in part to facilitate public 
sector f inancing, 1 0 may well raise the inflationary costs of the government ' s 
own financing programme. In a very repressed financial system, the maximum 
defici t :GNP ratio which could be financed at "acceptable" rates of inflation 
could be very low indeed.11 
The limits of external financing 
There are two main routes through which the financing of deficits with external 
borrowing can be argued to be limited. The first relates to the supply function of 
foreign saving (i.e. the willingness of foreigners to lend and the associated terms 
of the loans), and the second relates to the response of domestic economic 
agents to rising debt. 
As regards access to foreign saving, any country can be expected to face a 
supply curve of foreign financing which will either be flat or upward sloping. 
However, a large backlog of debt, and accumulating evidence of an actual or 
prospective inability to service that debt, will cause a radical upward shift of that 
supply curve to the point that further borrowing on "acceptable" terms ceases to 
be available. Many African countries have already reached this point (see Note 
4). Arrears on interest obligations, at around $5 billion, are equivalent to about 
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half the level of actual debt-service payments. In this climate, two main things 
have happened. First, the supply function of non-concessional f inancing has 
shifted to the point where new disbursements of such loans are a tiny fraction of 
their former levels, and only a few African countries have access to significant 
volumes of such loans. Second, bilateral providers of concessional loans have 
stepped in to at least partly replace the diminished availability of non-conces-
sional funds with conversions (debt to grants), reschedulings and cancellations 
of the obligations on such loans, as well as with initiatives such as the 1988 
Special Programme of Assistance intended to ease the burden of non-conces-
sional loans.12 
For the low-income countries of Africa, if we put these concessional and non-
concessional elements of the supply curve together, we would find that, up to a 
certain limit of funding, the effective supply curve is relatively flat and located 
at a relatively low real interest rate dominated by the concessional terms cur-
rently on offer. However, there are clear limits to the extent to which such fi-
nancing can be expected to be available to finance deficits in the short term, and 
major uncertainties about the magnitude of such funding in the longer term: at 
some point the supply curve will presumably switch non-continuously to a much 
higher posit ion.1 3 Moreover, the highly indebted middle-income countries of 
Africa do not have access to special programmes of concessional finance and, in 
this regard, are more immediately limited in the extent to which they can rely for 
deficit financing on external funds (see Research Issue No. 10). 
However, limits on external borrowing also emanate f rom the behaviour of 
domestic economic agents in a number of ways. Fry (1988), for example, has 
pointed out that, even in advance of any debt crisis emerging, some version of 
the Ricardian equivalence theory may well apply in developing countries. This 
could arise, for example, if enlarged external debt generates expectations of 
higher future taxation to service debt, but instead of this resulting in enhanced 
domestic saving (as it does in a closed-economy model), it encourages instead a 
transfer of wealth abroad. Similarly, the same enlarged debt burden might gen-
erate expectations of a devaluation to boost exports, and this also might encour-
age capital flight. In short, while moderate levels of external borrowing might 
well stimulate domestic investment, pushing that borrowing too far might well 
result—even in advance of a real debt crisis—in new capital inflows being 
matched by enlarged private-capital outflows (see Research Issue No. 11). 
Once the situation becomes critical, and there is a general acknowledgement 
that there is a large overhang of debt, the management of the domestic financial 
sector becomes extremely difficult, as the analysis of the Latin American expe-
riences by Sachs (1986) and others makes abundantly clear. Such an overhang, 
for example, makes it more difficult to gain political support for economic aus-
terity packages since any long-term economic gains f rom this are perceived to 
be more likely to benefit foreign creditors than domestic voters.14 
Equally, the knowledge that the public sector has lost access to external funds 
is likely to provoke both capital flight and reduced productive investment as 
economic agents seek to escape what they perceive to be an inevitably penal 
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inflation tax, or very high conventional taxation of their income and wealth. The 
debt forgiveness presently observed in Africa is, therefore, justified not only on 
humanitarian grounds but also from the viewpoint of evading these undesirable 
incentives to capital flight and lower investment.15 
In short, responsible policy makers are well advised to impose limits on their 
external borrowings, even where foreign suppliers of such funds are not them-
selves imposing such limits. However, the empirical question of what these lim-
its should be is difficult to answer, and must in any case be answered in the light 
of the specific circumstances of different countries. A failure to observe such 
limits will eventually complicate rather than ease the task of public sector fi-
nancing. 
Inflationary financing versus involuntary lending 
The argument so far has suggested that governments are seriously limited in the 
size of the deficits which can be financed using either inflationary methods or 
external borrowing. A question which naturally follows f rom this is whether the 
third main method of financing, namely involuntary domestic borrowing, offers 
an independent alternative to the first two methods or merely generates the same 
problems which characterize these. In basic textbook models of the money sup-
ply, it is a standard result that one major form of involuntary lending to the gov-
ernment, namely reserve requirements on the banks, can be increased so as to 
reduce the monetary and thus inflationary impulse associated with any given 
volume of high-powered money. Thus, in the simplest formulation of the money 
multiplier, we have: 
(6) MS = (1 + a ) / ( r + a ) . B 
where r = the ratio of banks ' deposit liabilities held in the form of cash, a = the 
cash:deposit ratio of the public, and B = the stock of high-powered (base) 
money. Thus, for a given value of B, a higher reserve requirement means a 
lower money stock and some downward pressure on prices. 
Unfortunately, this favourable relationship between reserve requirements and 
inflation takes no account at all of the tax effect of devices such as reserve re-
quirements on the banks and so on the evolution of the tax base. More recent lit-
erature has given explicit attention to this matter and has come up with radically 
different results. In an early model by Mathieson and McKinnon (1981), for ex-
ample, it is assumed that the government has only two sources of finance for its 
deficits, namely the inflation tax and a tax such as reserve requirements imposed 
on the domestic banking system. It is further assumed that the seignorage asso-
ciated with the expansion of the supply of currency and demand deposits is fully 
available to finance the government, while a proportional reserve requirement 
on time deposits is also available for this purpose. Then, using the simple three-
equation model set out below, the trade-off between inflation and the use of the 
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reserve-requirements tax is as defined in Figure 1, which also shows the situa-
tion for two possible levels of the government 's deficit. 
(7) h (ti, ii) = (1 - k).q(7C, id) 
(8) Z/P = [k q (ti, id) + f(7i, id)](7C + y) 
(9) i i ( l - k ) - id = 0 
where: 
y = the rate of real output 
K = the rate of inflation 
k = reserve requirements against time deposits 
Z = the government 's total deficit 
ii = the nominal interest rate on bank loans 
id = the nominal interest rate on bank deposits 
h = the demand function for bank loans 
q = the demand function for time deposits 
f = the demand function for currency. 
Essentially, what happens in this model is that an increase in the reserve-re-
quirements tax f rom zero initially enables a given government deficit to be fi-
nanced using less money creation (inflationary finance), and so inflation falls. 
However, as k rises further, the margin between deposit and lending interest 
rates which the banks need to charge to meet a zero profit, or any other profit 
target, also rises (equation 8). This causes the public to move up their loan-de-
mand curve for bank loans in response to the higher cost (the left-hand side of 
equation (6). In short, as the tax rate k on bank deposits is raised, the base to 
which that tax is applied will shrink. Beyond some critical value of k*, further 
rises in k will be self-defeating in so far as efforts to raise more government rev-
enue are concerned. Beyond that point, a higher k will merely raise inflation for 
any given government deficit, contrary to the result coming from simple mone-
tary analysis. In relation to the feasible methods of its possible financing, there 
is again a clear limit on the magnitude of the deficit which is sustainable (see 
Research Issue No. 12). 
Somewhat more sophisticated versions of the same line of analysis are pre-
sented in papers by both Fry (1988), and in Courakis (1988), and elsewhere. 
Fry ' s numerical model, which was briefly referred to in Section I above, is as 
follows: 
(10) li = 1 .05- I0.(id-7C) 
(11) DD = 1 - 4 ( i x ) 
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(12) TD = lO.(ix) - 6(n) 
(13) iT = ( l -k) . i , 
(14) LL = 0.75.(DD) = (1 - k). (TD) 
Figure 1 Reserve requirements and their effect on inflation 
As was also noted in Section I, if a government is concerned about inflation, 
then an economy having the parameters of this model can finance a deficit as 
high as 7.7 percent of GNP with an inflation rate of 46 percent. However, if in-
flation is required to be kept down to, say, 20 percent, then with seignorage and 
the rate of reserve requirements both set at 25 percent, it is still possible to 
achieve deficit financing equivalent to 5.7 percent of GNP. Fry also demon-
strates two further propositions of major policy relevance. First, differential 
rates of tax on the two components of the money stock have the potential to 
slightly raise the magnitude of the deficit which can be financed for a given rate 
of inflation.16 Second, the establishment of a binding administrative limit on 
loan interest rates will reduce the financeable deficit for any given rate of infla-
tion because it will prevent the banks passing through the interest-rate conse-
quences of any given rate of reserve requirements even to those borrowers who 
are able and willing to pay higher rates. His model suggests that financing 
equivalent to 1 - 2 percent of GNP could be lost by restrictions on interest rates 
when required reserves are set between 25 and 30 percent of deposits (see 
Research Issue No. 13). 
The two-category financing model (inflation and reserve requirements) dis-
cussed here can be used in a casual way to develop some further propositions 
about the impact of the external financing of deficits. One such proposition is 
that external financing available directly to the government will shift down the 
inflation:reserve-requirement trade-off shown in Figure 1 because there is now a 
smaller "residual" deficit to be financed using the two domestic sources of fund-
ing. However, this result itself is clearly subject to the limits on external borrow-
ing elaborated in the previous sub-section. A second proposition is that external 
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financing available directly to the private sector might well raise the trade-off 
shown in Figure 1. This would happen if the greater availability of external 
funds caused a substitution and downward shift in the domestic demand for 
bank credit. In this case, the associated contraction of the domestic banking 
sector would reduce the base of the reserve requirements tax and so necessitate a 
higher rate of inflation for any given government deficit. 
The central proposition from this sub-section is that there is, indeed, a limit on 
the size of government deficits which can be financed using the involuntary 
forms of borrowing discussed earlier. However, quite substantial proportions of 
GNP can be extracted in this way if governments are prepared to accept medium 
to high rates of inflation of 20 percent. Additionally, the technical management 
of interest-rate policies has a significant bearing on the revenues which are pos-
sible. 
Inflationary financing versus external borrowing 
In this final sub-section, we repeat the analysis just undertaken, but now on the 
basis that the two available forms of finance are external borrowing and the in-
flation tax. This case has recently been analysed by Corden (1988).17 He notes 
that for a given public deficit, a reduced balance of payments current account 
deficit will imply reduced external borrowing and so will necessitate a higher 
revenue from the inflation tax, implying higher inflation, to balance the govern-
ment ' s books.1 8 If this is not possible, then reduced government expenditure or 
higher taxes are required, but this will increase unemployment unless matched 
by other policies such as a real devaluation. Similarly, if there is a reduction in 
the rate of inflation, there will need to be an expansion of foreign borrowing and 
a worsened current account if again the existing government deficit is to be fi-
nanced. In short, in the type of adjustment situation in which most African 
countries now find themselves, the two common targets of adjustment, namely 
reduced inflation and an improved current account, are in conflict if it is also 
necessary to retain the same level of the government 's own deficit. If it is ac-
cepted that there are just the two forms of financing for the deficit, this amounts 
to a simple but powerful argument as to why fiscal deficits ought to be reduced 
as part of an adjustment programme. 
One particular problem arising f rom this line of analysis is the so-called 
"inflation-tax replacement problem" which is beginning to attract rigorous ap-
plied analysis but which has not been much explored in the African context. The 
basic proposition is that if fiscal deficits are a main cause of monetary expan-
sion, and monetary expansion is a main cause of inflation, then a successful bat-
tle against inflation implies the need to replace the inflation tax revenues avail-
able to government in one way or another. This can be done either by raising 
higher revenues f rom conventional taxation, reducing government expenditures 
or, as already noted, expanding external borrowing and accepting enlarged cur-
rent-account deficits. An important research question is the magnitude of the 
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replacement which is necessary for any given target rate of reduction of infla-
tion. Results f rom a study on Turkey by Van Wijnbergen (1988), suggest that 
they would be large. According to his results, a reduction of inflation f rom 50 
percent to 15 percent would reduce the revenues f rom monetization by 1.2 per-
centage points of GNP. This would not necessarily have to be found from en-
larged external borrowing, but if it were, the necessary deterioration in the cur-
rent account would be substantial (i.e. over 50 percent of the present level of 
non-interest deficits of most developing countries) (see Research Issue No. 14). 
On the other hand, the evidence f rom the Tanzi (1988) paper referred to earlier, 
suggests that inflation reduction will of itself have a favourable effect on rev-
enues f rom conventional taxation. 
Accepting that there is a trade-off between inflation and external deficits, how 
is the situation affected by the third category of financing? For our present pur-
poses it is assumed that this has a significant borrowing element and is not, as 
assumed in the previous sub-section, a pure tax. In brief, if there is initially in-
ternal balance, an enlarged use of government domestic borrowing to f inance 
enlarged expenditures will raise the domestic interest rate and will therefore 
crowd out some private investment in the first instance. If it were assumed that 
there was no external borrowing, then no change in the current account is possi-
ble and all the expenditure must be diverted to home goods. The real exchange 
rate will appreciate in response to the associated excess demand for home goods. 
The result, in other words, is crowding out and higher domestic prices. But, if 
external borrowing is allowed, this is likely to increase somewhat in response to 
higher domestic interest rates; the real exchange rate can, therefore, appreciate 
and help to contribute to an enlarged current account deficit. Furthermore, the 
higher domestic prices, reduced real money balances and higher real interest 
rates which arise when external borrowing is precluded are now avoided. In 
short, the more an economy is integrated with the international capital markets, 
the less will be the domestic-price-raising, crowding-out and interest-raising ef-
fects of an enlarged government deficit. In a highly integrated economy, the 
domestic interest rate will not be able to change very much and the particular 
type of domestic financing used by the government will not have much bearing 
on outcomes.19 
IV. Domestic financial crises and 
debt management 
A seriously under-researched aspect of the fiscal and public debt management 
problem in Africa is that associated with internal financial crisis. In brief, many 
of the same factors (deteriorating terms of trade, high interest rates, ill-con-
ceived investment projects) which have generated the external debt crisis in 
Africa have also substantially worsened the financial situations of thousands of 
productive enterprises in both the private and public sectors. Given that a large 
proportion of such enterprises are debtors to the domestic banks of their coun-
tries, the financial health of a major part of the banking systems in Africa has it-
self been rendered extremely frail. For developing countries as a whole, research 
by Long (1987) has suggested that the number of banks and financial institu-
tions that are now insolvent is without precedent in the last 50 years. 
Furthermore, the true magnitude of this problem is extremely hard to define in 
any country without access to a considerable amount of inside information. 
Long has suggested, as a rule of thumb, that the true level of non-performing 
loans may be as much as eight times the level actually shown in published bal-
ance-sheets (see Research Issue No. 15). 
The overhang of large internal debts and insolvent banks necessarily gener-
ates enormous distortions and problems for economic efficiency as the optimiz-
ing modes of behaviour which are broadly characteristic of sound financial sys-
tems are replaced by sub-optimal survival modes of behaviour, both in banks 
and in productive-sector enterprises. While in many cases this overhang will 
quickly show up as an intensification of the government 's own financing prob-
lem, this need not happen in all cases. There are several possibilities here which 
can best be explained by thinking of a set of representative productive enter-
prises which have invested in non-viable investment projects using funds bor-
rowed in part f rom domestic banks. They are now unable to pay either the inter-
est or the principle on the loans. 
If the enterprises in question are publicly owned, it is improbable, given past 
experiences in Africa and elsewhere, that many of them would be liquidated in 
order to pay off their debts: the political and economic difficulties normally 
preclude this except in the case of the smaller enterprises.20 Thus the accumu-
lated unpaid debts of these enterprises will remain partly as claims on the do-
mestic banking system. Since such debts can reasonably be regarded as contin-
gent liabilities of the government, given the public ownership of the enterprises, 
they involve future budgetary and fiscal implications which are potentially 
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extremely large in many countries. This is true irrespective of whether 
government formal ly assumes public-enterprise debts , as it is doing, or 
continues to allow these to exist by resort to a variety of ad hoc interventions. In 
those cases where the bad debts exceed the capital of the banks, the financial 
system may, nonetheless, stagger along for several years sustained either by 
misleading accounting practice21 or by various forms of ad hoc support to the 
banks by the government. These commonly include the guaranteeing of some of 
the loans and the provision of central banks ' rediscount ing facil i t ies on 
favourable terms. This latter category of intervention can clearly disturb the 
monetary policy objectives of a government and give rise to inflationary and 
public financing requirements considerably in excess of anything required by 
current levels of budgetary deficits narrowly defined. It has been widely argued 
to be associated with the loss of monetary control in a number of Latin 
American economies in the early 1980s.22 
If the enterprises in question are mainly privately owned, the situation is one 
stage removed from the responsibility of the budgetary authorities and does not 
show up so directly as a problem for public finance. However, if the problem of 
bad debts is pervasive, many of the same arguments which pressure govern-
ments to protect lame-duck public enterprises, will apply with equal force to 
private enterprises. This is most likely to happen through the provision of public 
guarantees of private-sector debts. As such guarantees become large, the magni-
tude of the future claim on the fiscal finances of the government grows too (see 
Research Issue No. 16). 
In both these cases, the failure or inability of governments to deal conclu-
sively with the bankruptcy of productive enterprises will leave a legacy of un-
sound banking systems and large incipient financing demands on the public fi-
nances which, while they remain unmet, will be likely to seriously colour the 
monetary policy performance of the government as well as the efficiency of the 
banking system. In general, and given the arguments of Section III above, gov-
ernments will be forced to resort to greater use of inflationary financing than 
would be required in the absence of the overhang of bad debts. 
Additionally to this problem of the stock of bad debts, there will also be pub-
lic finance implications associated with the flow of new operating losses f rom 
the affected enterprises. Such further losses will be likely if the invest-
ments/activities/conditions which caused the debt overhang in the first place 
continue to exist without any serious effort to restructure the companies in-
volved or amend the offending policy and other conditions. Depending on the 
stance of government policies, these losses may show up in the macro economy 
in several different ways. They may, for example, appear transparently in the 
government budget if direct subsidies and other transfers are paid f rom the gov-
ernment to, for example, loss-making public enterprises. Alternatively, they may 
show up as increased non-performing loans in the banking system if the banks 
attempt to protect their own capital by providing more loan facilities to their 
larger failing clients. Finally, it may show up as enhanced monetary expansion 
either because the enlarged fiscal deficit requires enhanced monetary financing 
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or, more directly, where increased central bank rediscounts are used to further 
support the ailing banks. What makes this such an awkward topic for empirical 
research is that the same basic circumstances in two countries may result in two 
or more quite different macro outcomes, at least in the short term, because of 
different approaches which the two governments may make in suppressing or 
facing the problem. Furthermore, the transparent appearance of the problem in 
published government budgets is the least likely outcome since governments in 
almost all continents manifest a strong tendency to obfuscate rather than reveal 
in this particular area. Nonetheless, it is a matter which warrants far more re-
search resources in the African context than it has so far been accorded. 
Further consequences 
A further and related topic for research relates to the behaviour of African 
banking systems, which although mildly to seriously financially impaired by the 
level of bad debts in their balance sheets will, nonetheless, if past experience is 
any guide, continue to function.23 Experiences in other parts of the world have 
suggested that such banks can easily get locked into a process of supporting 
failed clients in order to avert their own bankruptcy. This approach is likely to 
be self-perpetuating since borrowers in the productive sector that are themselves 
close to insolvency (i.e. zero equity) have nothing to lose by increasing their 
borrowing, however high the cost. Equally, the managements of banks which 
are close to insolvency, have a high propensity to behave in a reckless fashion. 
While this is happening, viable firms may be crowded out f rom access to funds 
in a variety of ways. They may, for example, delay their own investment plans 
because of an inadequate availability or the excessive cost of credit funds. Thus 
the phenomena of "adverse risk selection" may turn the financial crisis into an 
investment crisis, which in turn will slow the economic growth of the economy 
and hamper the recovery prospects of some at least of the distressed productive 
enterprises. The situation is made more intense if there are strong expectations 
that, in time, governments will bail out major debtors in both the financial and 
productive sectors. In this case, both enterprises and banks are encouraged to 
worry even less about excessive borrowing and lending, respectively (see 
Research Issue No. 17). 
The factor which unifies this issue with the more conventional public finance 
issues discussed in Section III, is the analytical similarity between a govern-
ment-imposed reserve requirement on the banks, and a worse overhang of bad 
public- or private-sector debt than is otherwise necessary. For a given public 
sector deficit (narrow or broad), both are likely to involve a higher rate of infla-
tion than would otherwise be necessary because the "bad-debts tax" will itself 
reduce the base of the tax to which reserve requirements can be applied. Thus, 
public finance problems arise irrespective of whether the overhang of internal 
bad debts is directly resulting in fiscal problems or not (see Research Issue No. 
18). 
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Solutions 
Although it is not the proper subject matter of this present paper, it is pertinent 
to note that a useful literature on possible escape routes f rom situations of inter-
nal financial distress is beginning to emerge. This is much influenced by the 
case-study materials f rom Chile and Malaysia which are generally acknowl-
edged as successful in the field (de Juan, 1988; Shen, 1988; Hinds, 1988; Roe 
and Popiel, 1988; Roe 1988). However, the case studies certainly support con-
ceptualization and taxonomies of the situation which are likely to have relevance 
in the African context as well (see Research Issue No. 19). 
V. Fiscal policy and adjustment 
It is an underlying theme of this paper so far that the normal targets of adjust-
ment programmes, namely reduced external deficits/debt and lower inflation, 
require serious moderation in budgetary deficits if they are to be achieved. This 
is not because of any dogmatic view of the merits of private- versus public-sec-
tor activity, or because of a necessarily critical stance towards particular cate-
gories of government expenditure. It stems merely f rom the real difficulties of 
financing large public deficits in economies with thin capital markets and low 
domestic saving. But there is another and complicating aspect to the question of 
fiscal policies and adjustment. This is that many of the policy instruments of 
adjustment programmes which are necessary to achieve one or more of the ob-
jectives of the programmes also feed back adversely on the size of the public 
deficit which needs to be financed.24 An obvious example is the conflict between 
the lower import tariffs possibly required as part of a trade reform, and the level 
of total import duty revenues. However, in the context of a discussion of debt 
management two main policy instruments, namely the exchange rate and nomi-
nal interest rates, pose particular problems, and hence it is these two instruments 
which are singled out for attention in this present section of the paper. 
Devaluation 
There are several interrelated ways in which a nominal or real exchange rate de-
valuation may impinge on the fiscal problems of a government, but three, in 
particular, can be emphasized. First, devaluation by raising the relative prices of 
tradeable to non-tradeable goods will change the government 's budgetary situa-
tion adversely or favourably to the extent that the government is a buyer or 
seller of tradeable goods. The point which is most commonly emphasized in this 
context is that the government is often a substantial importer of tradeable goods, 
and so will be required to find a higher level of local currency expenditures after 
a devaluation than before. In countries such as Ghana, Sudan and Uganda, 
where circumstances and policies have generated a progessive strangulation of 
import availability over the years, imports by the government have come to 
represent a large proportion of total imports. Thus, the government will bear the 
largest part of the enhanced direct cost of imports and the fiscal burden of de-
valuation may be high. But of comparable importance for many African gov-
ernments is the question of the expenditures associated with external debt 
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service. As Corden (1988) notes, external debt service is analytically equivalent 
to a tradeable good and so a nominal devaluation will have the same negative ef-
fect on the budgetary position through enhanced interest payments as through 
the enhanced cost of imports. The political economy of the situation is such that 
governments which have monopolized a substantial part of imports in their own 
hands, and have been directly responsible for a major part of their countries ' 
external borrowing, will find it harder to accept a nominal devaluation than 
governments of more liberal persuasion (see Research Issue No. 20).25 
Second, an overvalued exchange rate is of ten applied in such a way as to 
represent an important part of the tax-raising apparatus of the governments. For 
example, the use of import tariffs and quotas as an alternative foreign exchange 
equilibrating device to a realistic exchange rate, has the effect of raising home-
goods prices and the prices of importables relative to the prices of exportables. 
A government can extract revenue from these price distortions either directly as, 
for example, when it extracts import duty revenues or indirectly when, for ex-
ample, it purchases the higher priced home goods using the local currency 
equivalent of revenues f rom exports which it passes on to producers only at the 
overvalued (i.e. less favourable) rate. This latter point becomes more transparent 
when an explicit dual exchange rate unfavourable to pr imary-commodity ex-
porters is applied as, for example, in recent years in Uganda (coffee) and Sudan 
(cotton). Since a devaluation, and especially one which unifies an otherwise 
multiple exchange rate, will remove these price distortions it will also reduce the 
tax revenues which depend on such distortions. However, this is not a good rea-
son for rejecting the use of devaluation. If it is only relative prices which are 
changing, it is clearly possible to conceive of a revised structure of taxes which 
leaves total revenues unchanged. For example, if the price-raising effects of im-
port protection have come mainly from quotas rather than f rom tariffs, then de-
valuation, the retention of ad valorem tariffs and the scrapping of quotas, may 
well raise import duty revenues. Similarly, if the local currency earnings of ex-
porters are raised by devaluation, the government may well be able to replace a 
part of the revenues it extracted directly by new arrangements for the export, or 
income taxation of exporters. This is in addition to any longer term revenue 
gains associated with a more efficient use of resources and faster growth. 
The third point is probably the most important in some of the more obviously 
repressed economies of Africa, such as Ghana, Sudan, and Uganda. This is that 
the distortions associated with excessive protection of imports and the excessive 
taxation of exports are demonstrably capable of reducing tax bases by driving 
into parallel/illegal markets both importing activity and exporting activity. The 
very high proportions of Ghanaian cocoa smuggled into the Cote d ' lvoire , the 
large volumes of Ugandan coffee similarly smuggled, and the estimates that 
more than half of Sudan 's imports are smuggled into the country, are major ex-
amples of this general proposition. One of the next most important functions of 
a devaluation, and other measures to end obvious price distortions, may well be 
to bring more of these parallel market activities back into the official channels. 
To the extent that this does occur, government revenues are directly and 
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immediately enhanced as official and taxable export and import trade replaces 
the smuggled and untaxable trade. The Ghanaian recovery programme instituted 
in 1983 is a good example of this proposition since, under the tutelage of an 
active exchange rate policy, it saw the government revenue share of GDP rise 
f rom a miserly 5 percent to a level in excess of 12 percent in just two or three 
years. 
In short, the fiscal consequences of devaluation are complex and difficult to 
assess quantitatively. While it is easy to point to the direct expenditure-raising 
factors (i.e. point 1 above), these are the short-term and static consequences and 
do not represent a sufficient basis to reject a devaluation, especially where the 
pre-existing situation is clearly one of chronic overvaluation. Almost all African 
countries would benefit f rom careful quantitative research into the fiscal conse-
quences of the distortions associated with overvaluation and related policies (see 
Research Issue No. 21). Such research could help identify the possible directions 
of the tax reforms needed to sustain revenues in the face of the unwinding of the 
distortions. This is a technically very demanding task, but one which has rarely 
been looked at as a topic for serious quantitative research. 
The final point to note is that adjustment is essentially a process of bringing 
expenditures into line with production so as to generate a sustainable external 
payments situation. The pressures which devaluation imposes on a government 
are clearly in the direction of forcing a reduction, either of the government 's 
own expenditures or, to the extent that higher costs are passed through, the re-
duction is imposed on the expenditures of companies or households in the pri-
vate sector. In this context, the rejection of devaluation can often be regarded 
more as a statement of the political unwillingness to accept these inevitable ex-
penditure cuts, than as a statement about the technical unsuitability of the in-
strument.26 
Interest-rate policy 
African financial policies have more often than not been characterized by inter-
est rates administered at a low nominal level, which has of ten meant highly 
negative real interest rates for substantial periods.27 The consequences, espe-
cially for the mobilization of saving through formal financial institutions and the 
effective allocation of saving to efficient investment projects, are well estab-
lished in the literature on financial repression associated with Shaw (1973), 
McKinnon (1973), Galbis (1976 and 1977) and many others. This phenomenon 
of financial repression and low interest rates is directly associated with bud-
getary policy in that, because government deficits in most African countries are 
a major user of private savings, governments have a strong vested interest in 
keeping interest rates low and in capturing access to private savings in the low-
cost ways described in Section II above (see Research Issue No. 22). However, 
the dangers associated with this are increasingly well understood and at least 
some token recognition of the need for financial-sector liberalization has been 
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included in most African adjustment programmes in recent times. This opens up 
numerous issues for research, and not least about the consequences of moving 
from a tight control of interest rates to something close to fully liberated rates 
while other markets in the economy are still operating in a non-equilibrium 
manner.28 Irrespective of the longer term merits of a freer system, there are sev-
eral good reasons why caution in this area is advised and why certain pre- condi-
tions are necessary if the policy is to be successful. Some of these relate to the 
interaction between higher interest rates and government deficits. 
W e can begin by recalling some of the propositions elaborated earlier in the 
paper. First, when government deficits are large, i.e. 4 or 5 percent of G D P or 
above, economic agents will normally correctly anticipate that inflationary 
methods will have to be mobilized to finance a substantial part of those deficits. 
In this situation, "free" interest rates will imply extremely high nominal levels of 
these rates, including a large premium for expected inflation, if the public are to 
be persuaded to voluntarily supply enough of their savings to fully meet the 
government 's requirements. With deficits at a level equivalent to the African 
average of 8 percent of GDP, it is unlikely, using Fry 's model, that nominal in-
terest rates could be kept much below 50 percent, for example. As well as radi-
cally worsening the financial situation of the insolvent and highly leveraged 
companies discussed in Section IV, high nominal interest rates would damage 
otherwise financially sound companies whose output price indexes happened to 
be moving upward, at least temporarily, at a slower rate than the rate of inter-
est.29 Thus government deficits in their broad sense would be enhanced, both di-
rectly as interest costs rose and indirectly as increased levels of the various sup-
ports to productive enterprises elaborated in Section IV became necessary. The 
only tenable conclusion in this context is that the underlying level of govern-
ment deficits would need to be reduced quite radically f rom the present average 
levels in Africa before any serious liberalization of interest rates would be pos-
sible (see Research Issue No. 23). 
Second, in the models which emphasize government financing from the infla-
tion tax, and from reserve requirements on the banks, it is evident that a larger 
deficit can be financed for a given rate of inflation if the banks are not restricted 
as to the interest rates they can charge on loans. However, in the light of the dis-
cussion of the previous paragraph and the possible existence of large numbers of 
highly leveraged enterprises, this certainly cannot be construed as an argument 
for a virtually unconstrained removal of controls on interest rates. 
Third, it is extremely easy, as recent experiences in Latin America amply tes-
tify, for inappropriate financial policies to give rise simultaneously to enlarged 
governmental borrowing from abroad at the same time as private savers are 
moving funds out of the country. There is no simple connection between interest 
differentials and capital flight, but it is clear that if other policies are sound, 
"realistic" levels of domestic interest rates can operate to discourage outward 
capital movements . Thus, although higher interest rates on its own domestic 
debt may directly increase the deficit the government has to manage, the financ-
ing of that enlarged deficit may be easier if higher interest rates discourage 
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capital f l ight and so make a larger part of domestic savings available for 
domestic financing. The two complementary policies, above all others, which 
need to be managed soundly for this proposition to be valid are exchange-rate 
policy and general fiscal policy. If the fiscal deficit is very large, then the 
expectat ions of higher inflation and/or higher future taxation and/or large 
devaluations (if external borrowing is used for defici t f inancing), will all 
represent pressures for large capital outf lows, and extremely high nominal 
interest rates will be needed to offset these pressures. Similarly, if the real 
exchange rate is seen to be seriously overvalued, very high nominal interest 
rates will be needed to compensate for high rates of expected fu ture 
devaluation.30 
A factor unifying our brief discussion of exchange-rate and interest-rate poli-
cies is that, in addition to their textbook effects, these policies can both generate 
rapid advantages for public finances and so provide a substantial contribution to 
the possible short-term success of an adjustment programme. In the case of the 
exchange rate, the benefits can come in the form of the enlarged revenues asso-
ciated with the diversion of underground export and import activities into the 
official channels. In the case of interest rates, the benefits can come through a 
discouragement of capital flight, and so to the possibility of financing a given 
deficit at a lower inflation rate and with lower taxes on the financial system. 
Unfortunately, in both these cases, there are direct costs in the form of enlarged 
public expenditures to offset against these benefits, and it is not possible in gen-
eral terms to say where the balance of advantage will lie. However, given the 
importance of the matter for practical policy formulation, it certainly justifies 
more in-depth applied research. 
IV. Approaches to stimulating 
domestic saving and the 
broadening of capital 
markets 
It is common ground that many of the problems and trade-offs involved in 
deficit finance and discussed in the previous section would be easier if govern-
ments could rely on larger volumes of domestic saving and, in particular, had 
access to large voluntary supplies of financing through domestic capital-market 
instruments. But capital-market development, even in middle-income develop-
ing countries, is extremely limited and there are few countries in Africa which 
could aspire to finance a deficit equivalent to even 1 percent of GDP through the 
sales of government securities on a voluntary basis. Nonetheless, domestic capi-
tal-market development, and other steps to boost domestic saving, ought to be 
included in the agenda of financial reform programmes and this section identi-
fies some of the problems and research issues which this element of reform 
would probably require. 
The first and most important point to make is that deep and active capital 
markets are unlikely to emerge in countries characterized by high levels of 
macroeconomic and, possibly also, political instability. Financial systems can 
potentially offer some security against certain categories of uncertainty but are 
unlikely to funct ion well when, for example, the inflation rate is high and 
volatile. This is guaranteed to establish strong biases in favour of short-term 
debt instruments, both on the part of lenders (savers) and borrowers (investors), 
and so will curtail the spectrum of maturity choices, and maturity transforma-
tions, which are features of well-developed capital markets. In short, financial 
stabilization is a necessary prior step to the development of capital markets: the 
latter taken on its own cannot really make any serious contribution to the 
former. 
Similarly, controlled interest rates which routinely maintain the returns on the 
main financial instruments of an economy below the expected rate of inflation 
will be an incentive to borrowing/dissaving rather than lending/saving. If the 
instruments in question operate, as in many African countries, to transfer re-
sources to government at the lowest possible cost, then would-be holders of such 
instruments will be deterred by the unrealistic returns and the government will 
be forced back on the various devices of compulsory financing which we dis-
cussed earlier. In short, high inflation, as well as interest rates which completely 
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fail to reflect that inflation, are certain recipes for the emergence of financial 
sectors which are thin and biased towards the shorter maturities. But, as we have 
noted in Sections II and III of this paper, these are two almost inevitable features 
of economies which operate with high budgetary deficits, unless, of course, 
these deficits can be reliably and cheaply financed f rom external sources. In 
such economies, it is redundant to suggest that tax incentives and other measures 
can be put in place to help foster the development of securities and capital mar-
kets so as to give the government access to enlarged domestic savings on a more 
voluntary basis. Indeed, without a prior reduction in deficits—probably to levels 
of 5 percent of GDP or below—it is unlikely that the returns on capital market 
instruments in nominal and real terms could be made sufficiently attractive to 
encourage a serious boost to domestic savings31 and to the diversification of 
portfolios. 
However, if these basic pre-conditions, namely reasonable economic stability 
and low inflation, could be established, then there are a variety of issues which 
could be addressed in order to promote a more diversified financial sector. Since 
several of these would lend themselves to lengthy discussion, we confine our-
selves here to a simple listing of some of the more important of the issues. 
Factors conditioning the supply of securities 
It will normally be the case that the government itself may be able to issue a 
plentiful supply of paper, but the creation of a supply of bonds, and possibly 
equities as well, is often inhibited by: 
(a) A predominance in many African countries of very small corporate sec-
tors; 
(b) A heavy dominance within the corporate sector of public enterprises 
used to borrowing directly from government; 
(c) Within private corporate sectors, a predominance of family-owned busi-
nesses unhappy, possibly, about the greater disclosure and scrutiny asso-
ciated with public issues rather than in-family borrowing and lending; 
(d) The high costs of issuing and trading in securities arising from thin mar-
kets and unsophisticated techniques; 
(e) Fiscal disincentives for the issue of securities relative, for example, to 
borrowing from the banking system; 3 2 
(f) The absence of any positive incentives for companies going public. 
Of these various difficulties, the ones that are most easily corrected are those 
concerned with the fiscal disincentives against, and incentives for, the greater 
supply of capital-market instruments. The other problems are major and not 
easily put right by marginal changes in public policy. 
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Factors conditioning the demand for securities 
There are numerous difficulties in persuading private savers, as well as institu-
tions, in relatively unsophisticated financial markets to move heavily into se-
curities investments. The problems include: 
(a) A legitimate lack of confidence on the part of investors in both the mar-
ketability of the instruments and their ability to preserve their initial 
capital values; 
(b) A lack of confidence about the issuing institutions, be they governmental 
organizations or private companies, based either on lack of experience or 
previous examples of unreliabilty; 
(c) A lack of confidence based on the inadequacy of accounting, reporting 
and auditing standards in the issuing companies; 
(d) A concern about the possibilities of market values being manipulated by 
a limited group of inside traders; 
(e) Tax arrangements which convert satisfactory and competitive gross re-
turns on private-sector securities into returns which completely fail to be 
competitive on a net basis. 
Most of these problems can only be resolved through a long-term and com-
mitted programme to put in place the full range of institutions, including the 
regulatory, accounting and other standards which can build the confidence of the 
investing public in securities investment. Again, however, the tax arrangements 
referred to in the last point can be put to rights relatively quickly if there is a real 
will to do so. The major dilemma here is, again, one which concerns public fi-
nances. The tax treatment of security investment, if it is discriminatory at all, 
will normally discriminate in favour of public over private issues. Thus the 
ending of this discrimination in the interests of constructing a broader financial 
system will normally involve more expensive financing of the government ' s 
own deficit before it helps to achieve an easier and sounder f inancing of that 
deficit. 
Appendix 
Financing requirements of 
selected African countries 
Data sources: International Monetary Fund, Government Financial Statistics, 1987 
Yearbook and International Financial Statistics, various issues. 
Actual figures are presented in Tables A-l to A-13. Deficit trends are graphically 
shown in Figure A.1 
All figures relate to central government finances. Percentage figures for revenue 
(total revenue plus grants), expenditure (total expenditure plus lending less repay-
ments), and total financing requirements are proportions of respective nominal GDP to 
give an indication of the relative size of government and deficits. Financing flows are 
all "net" taking into account new flows, interest payments and amortization. 
Botswana (see Table A- l ) 
Of the 13 countries studied in this Appendix, Botswana's government sector is un-
doubtedly the largest in terms of total revenue and expenditure as a percentage of 
nominal GDP. Botswana's deficit position would also appear to be at odds with the 
other African economies. Revenues as a percentage of GDP rose from 35% (pula 66 
million) in 1974 to 48.9% (pula 388 million) by 1982. With expenditures rising as a 
percentage from 38% (pula 72 million) to a peak of 51.4% (pula 407 million) over the 
same period, financing requirements after standing at 3% (pula 5.7 million) in 1974 
had declined, to leave a surplus amounting to 4% (pula 21.4 million) in 1979. Deficit 
financing was required again, however, from 1980 to 1982, by which time the re-
quirement had reached 2.5% (pula 20.1 million). Subsequently, due to the strong rise 
in revenues, a large growing surplus was evident in the post-1982 period, reaching ap-
proximately 25% of GDP in 1985 and 1986. 
The sharp rise in revenues has been mainly due to increases in the taxation on in-
come and profits and non-tax revenue as a proportion of GDP. Meanwhile, general 
public expenditures, education, health, housing and social-security expenditures have 
grown relatively slowly. For example, while income tax revenues have increased from 
pula 15.6 million to pula 320.77 million between 1974 and 1985, expenditures on edu-
cation, health and social security together have increased from pula 13.7 to only pula 
163.6 million over the same period. 
With a surplus over much of the period, deficit financing has clearly not been of 
importance in Botswana and therefore financing figures are not analysed here. 
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Ghana (see Table A-2) 
Central government expenditure has been consistently greater than revenue throughout 
the 1974 to 1985 period, though the actual size of the government sector has been 
small relative to that of Botswana. For example, revenue as a percentage of GDP 
stood at 12.5% (cedi 584 million) in 1974. Expenditure of 16.7% (cedi 780 million) 
meanwhile necessitated a financing requirement of some 4.2% of GDP (cedi 196 mil-
lion). However, by 1977 revenues had fallen to 10.5% whilst expenditure had risen to 
20%, leading to an increased deficit amounting to 9.5% (cedi 1,057 million). Between 
1977 and 1980, expenditure fell more relative to simultaneously declining revenue 
leading to a lower financing requirement of 4.2% (cedi 1,808 million) by 1980. In 
1981 and 1982, expenditures remained static whilst revenue fell to a low of 4.5% (cedi 
3,279 million) before rising to reach 5.6% (cedi 4,856 million) in 1982. Therefore, 
after rising to 6.5%, the financing requirement fell back to 5.6% (cedi 4,848 million) 
in 1982 and 1983 witnessed a sharp fall in the deficit as expenditures fell whilst rev-
enues remained a stable proportion of GDP. Despite rising expenditures in 1984, fur-
ther gains in revenue facilitated another fall in the deficit to 1.8% of GDP (cedi 4,843 
million). Subsequently, due to faster expenditure growth, a widening of the deficit to 
2.2% of GDP (cedi 7,579 million) occurred in 1985. 
Given the persistence of fiscal deficits in Ghana, it is intuitive to consider how these 
financing requirements were met. External sources of finance were not utilized in 
1974, 1977 or 1979. Indeed, in 1974 a net outflow of funds from the government to 
external sources of cedi 1.4 million was evident, representing interest payments and 
amortization of past debts.2 Thus the requirement of cedi 196 million in 1974 was fi-
nanced entirely by domestic sources, with the monetary authority meeting cedi 115.1 
million (or 58.6% of the deficit).3 In 1977 a cedi 13 million external transfer (or rather 
purchase of government debt), contributed 1.2% towards the cedi 1,057 million re-
quirement. Once again, the monetary authorities contributed the majority (61.7%) of 
the domestic financing necessary. This proportion had increased again in 1979 to 
73.2% (cedi 1,318 million) or the cedi 1,800 million financing requirement. In 1980 
there was, however, a sharp increase in external sources of finance to 16% (cedi 290 
million) of the cedi 1,808 million requirement. The monetary authorities continued, 
however, to provide the largest source of funds at 61.7% of the deficit. This trend was 
temporarily reversed in 1981 as external purchases of government debt amounted to 
only 7.7% (cedi 376 million) of an increased cedi 4,707 million deficit. Again, funding 
of cedi 3,311 million from the monetary authority was by far the largest contribution 
(70.3%). 
In absolute nominal terms, the deficit and external sources of finance remained vir-
tually static in 1982. However, the monetary authority ceased to be the biggest domes-
tic source of funds, supplying only cedi 1,673 million (34.5%), as that forthcoming 
from the non-financial private sector, in particular, increased temporarily to cedi 2,538 
million which combined with other (non-deposit money banks) financial institutions, 
financed 56.7% (cedi 2,748 million). With financing requirements increasing to cedi 
4,933 million in 1983,4 external sources were sharply higher at cedi 970 million 
(19.7%). Significantly, finance from the monetary authority declined further to only 
cedi 455 million (9.2%). The remaining finance was forthcoming from, once again, 
other financial institutions, and the non-financial private sector, which together met 
cedi 1,670 million (33.9%) of requirements. Funding from deposit money banks 
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became significant at cedi 1,700 million (34.5%). 
External financing increased again in 1984 to cedi 1,815 million, supplying 37.5% 
of the cedi 4,843 million requirement. With Financing from the deposit money banks, 
other financial institutions and the non-financial private sector combined decreased, 
financing from the monetary authority was necessarily higher at cedi 2,289 million 
(47%). An increased deficit of cedi 7,579 million in 1985 was financed in large part 
through an increased contribution from abroad of cedi 3,522 million (46.5%). Of do-
mestic financing, that from the monetary authorities was lower at cedi 1,800 million 
(23.7%), with most of the remainder originating from other financial institutions (cedi 
1,878 million or 24.8%). Data for 1986 were unavailable at the time of writing. 
Kenya (see Table A-3) 
Kenya has consistently run a deficit over the period with the size of the government 
sector lying somewhere between that of Botswana and Ghana. In 1974, revenues stood 
at 18.2% (Sh 3,696 million), whilst expenditure of 21.1% (Sh 4,283 million) led to a 
financing requirement of 2.9% (Sh 587 million). In 1977, revenues were lower in rela-
tive terms at 17.2% (Sh 6,383 million) causing the deficit to increase, despite a fall in 
the expenditure share to 3.6% (Sh 1,327 million). By 1979, however, both expendi-
tures and revenues had increased to stand at 28.8% and 22.2%, respectively, thus re-
quiring financing equivalent to some 6.6% of GDP (Sh 3,015 million). This deficit 
fluctuated around 6% up to 1982 (by which time it had reached Sh 4,462 million), 
with revenues and expenditures being close to 25% and 29%, respectively. However, a 
sharp fall in expenditures, combined with only slight fall in revenues, saw the deficit 
halved in percentage terms to 2.1% (Sh 1,597 million) in 1983. Subsequently, with 
revenue stagnant at around 20% of GDP, and expenditure rising to 28.2% (Sh 3,754 
million), financing requirements had increased to 7.4% of GDP (Sh 9,841 million) in 
1987. 
In 1974, external sources of finance contributed Sh 209 million (35.9%) towards the 
total Sh 587 million requirement. Of this, international development institutions (IDI) 
and foreign governments were the most important, providing 16.4% and 10.1%, re-
spectively. Other external sources funded the equivalent of 9.2% of total require-
ments.5,6 In 1977, external sources again provided approximately 35% of the increased 
Sh 1,327 million requirement. However, with an outflow of Sh 19 million to non-offi-
cial sources, the contributions from the IDIs and foreign governments were higher at 
16.9% and 19.4% of total requirements, respectively. Subsequently, 36.7% of the in-
creased requirement of Sh 3,015 million in 1979 was financed externally, with that 
from IDIs substantially higher at Sh 656 million (21.8%), whilst the net contribution 
from non-official sources became positive and equivalent to 6.6% of requirements. 
These non-official flows were significantly higher at Sh 728 million, financing 
30.2% of a reduced Sh 2,409 million requirement in 1980. Though finance from both 
official sources declined in absolute terms, the total contribution to financing require-
ments made by external sources was considerably greater at 52.6%. Subsequently, 
with finance from non-official sources static in 1981, an increase in official funding 
led to an increase in total foreign financing to Sh 1,876 million. However, this only 
met 46.9% of the increased Sh 4,002 million requirement. Total external sources fi-
nanced only 37.8% of requirements in 1982. However, of this, non-official financing 
was approximately double the previous year's in absolute terms, whilst net funding 
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from official sources was substantially reduced. 
Net external contributions financed 47.6% of the reduced deficit in 1983. 
Underlying this, non-official funding fell to only Sh 290 million (7.5%), as IDI contri-
butions increased substantially to Sh 1,095 million (28.5%). This trend was reversed in 
1984 as non-official flows increased to Sh 1,181 million, contributing 76.3% of exter-
nal finance, which in turn contributed the equivalent of 36.2% of the financing re-
quirement. Finally, in 1985 external sources, though higher at Sh 1,842 million, fi-
nanced only 29.5% of the total deficit, with approximately equal net contributions 
from IDIs, foreign governments and other (non-official) sources. 
Malawi (see Table A-4) 
Financing requirements in excess of 5% of GDP have consistently occurred in 
Malawi. In 1974 and 1977, revenue of 15.9% (kwacha 73.2 million and 17.2% 
(kwacha 126 million), respectively, and expenditure of 22.2% (kwacha 102 million) 
and 23.5% (kwacha 170 million) led to deficits of 6.3% (kwacha 29 million) and 6.2% 
(kwacha 45 million) of GDP. Though revenue had risen up to 1980, a more pro-
nounced increase in expenditures to stand at 39.4% (kwacha 396 million) led to a fi-
nancing requirement of 15.9% (kwacha 160 million). With revenues stagnating (at 
between 20 and 23%) at a time of declining expenditures, this requirement had fallen 
back to 5.2% (kwacha 88.3 million) by 1984. Continuing to 1986, although revenues 
have risen to 23.8% (kwacha 549 million), increasing expenditures led to another rise 
in the deficit to 8% (kwacha 163 million) in 1985 and 7% (kwacha 160.5 million) in 
1986. This percentage level was maintained despite falling expenditures, as revenues 
also fell sharply to be significantly below 20% in 1987 ? 
Of the kwacha 29.2 million deficit in 1974, external sources accounted for some 
64% of funding requirements. Of this, official sources (IDI kwacha 7.5 million and 
foreign governments kwacha 11.2 million) were the major contributors. Of domestic 
financing, monetary authorities supplied only kwacha 2.2 million (7.5%). With the 
deficit widening to kwacha 45.2 million in 1977, external sources contributed kwacha 
41 million or 90.8% of funds. Again, the majority of this originated from official 
sources (77.3%). "Other" non-official external sources were higher at kwacha 7.2 mil-
lion. 
By 1979, with financing requirements of kwacha 75.5 million, financing from ex-
ternal sources was lower at kwacha 39.7 million (52.6%). Of the increased domestic 
financing the biggest source of funds was the deposit money banks which contributed 
kwacha 18 million (23.8%). With non-financial public enterprise providing kwacha 
8.18 million (10.8%), the monetary authorities were required to fund kwacha 9.1 mil-
lion (12.1%) of the deficit, and 1980's substantial increase in the deficit to kwacha 
160.3 million was met by a similar proportion of external financing, reaching in fact 
kwacha 83.1 million (51.9%). However, of this, non-official flows had increased sig-
nificantly to kwacha 44.8 million (27.9%) to become the largest source of external 
funding. Meanwhile, of the increased domestic financing necessary, kwacha 77.1 mil-
lion (48.1%), the monetary authority supplied kwacha 43.8 million (27.3% of total re-
quirements). 
In 1981, the deficit fell to kwacha 137.7 million. However, external sources were 
substantially lower at only kwacha 33.67 (24.4%), as "other", non-official flows 
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became negligible. This necessitated domestic financing of kwacha 104.3 million, of 
which the bulk was provided by the monetary authority (kwacha 93.4 million or 
67.8% of total requirements). Financing requirements fell further in 1982 to kwacha 
95 million. Increased official external finance from IDI of kwacha 65.9 million fi-
nanced 69.4% of the deficit. Indeed, net other external flows had become significantly 
negative.8 Of the required kwacha 32.5 million domestic financing, that from the 
monetary authority had declined substantially to kwacha 15.7 million, whilst that from 
deposit money banks had increased to kwacha 15.2 million. 
The year 1983 witnessed a further increase in IDI flows. Indeed, at kwacha 112.1 
million, they were greater than the financing requirement of kwacha 101.8 million. 
Outflows to foreign governments and others (of interest payments and amortization) 
on the external accounts, and to deposit money banks (kwacha 39.5 million, in fact) 
and other areas of general government on the internal accounts, necessitated kwacha 
51.8 million of financing from the monetary authority. In 1984, with contributions of 
kwacha 39 million and kwacha 91.8 million, respectively, the monetary authorities 
and IDIs were the two main sources of funding for the reduced requirement of kwacha 
88.3 million. With an outflow to other external sources of finance of kwacha 31.2 mil-
lion total domestic financing necessarily increased to kwacha 32.2 million. 
In 1985, despite an increased deficit of kwacha 162.6 million, external sources, or 
rather IDI, increased to only kwacha 101.6 million (62.5%). With a continued outflow 
of funds to foreign governments and other foreign contributors, the net external con-
tribution was only kwacha 68.9 million, necessitating domestic funding of kwacha 
93.7 million. With finance from other financial institutions significantly higher at 
kwacha 44.2 million from previously negligible levels, only kwacha 48 million 
(29.5%) of finance was required from the monetary authority. 
Mauritius (see Table A-5) 
Financing of equivalent to 5.7% of GDP (Rs 202 million) was required in 1974, with 
revenue standing at 13.1% (Rs 460 million) and expenditure at 18.8% (Rs 662 mil-
lion). By 1977, however, the size of government had increased significantly with ex-
penditure and revenue shares reaching 33% (Rs 1,630 million) and 23.7% (Rs 1,173 
million), respectively. Financing requirements were also higher at 9.2% (Rs 456.8 
million). By 1979, revenues had fallen back to 18.5%. However, with expenditure 
falling back to only 30.1%, the deficit increased further to 11.5% of GDP (Rs 882 
million). Continuing to 1981, expenditure rose to be at 33% (Rs 3,366 million) again 
with revenues, after rising to 20.8% in 1980, falling to 20.3% in 1981, leading to an-
other widening of the deficit to a peak 12.7% (Rs 1,293 million). After falling to 
19.5% in 1982, revenue has been between 21 and 22% of GDP up to 1986. With ex-
penditure falling, financing requirements had been cut to only 3.2% (Rs 640 million) 
in 1986. Subsequently, however, the deficit rose to 4.1% (Rs 939), due to a fall in rev-
enue share as the expenditure share remained static. 
In 1974, the deficit of Rs 202 million was financed mainly through a domestically 
sourced contribution of Rs 172.2 million (85.4%). Due to net flows from central gov-
ernment to other general government of Rs 37.7 million, and to deposit money banks 
of Rs 36.2 million, financing from the monetary authority of Rs 226.2 million was 
necessary. With funding of Rs 21.3 million from other domestic sources, external 
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financing accounted for the remaining Rs 29.5 million, of which the bulk of Rs 22.6 
million came from foreign governments. The structure of financing was similar in 
1977 with Rs 386.6 million of domestic funds providing 84.6% of the increased Rs 
456.8 million requirement. Again, due to flows from government to other general gov-
ernment and deposit money banks, the monetary authority supplied Rs 479.3 million 
of funds, with "others" supplying Rs 114.7 million.9 Meanwhile, of external contribu-
tions, funding from international development institutions had increased to Rs 36.1 
million and that from foreign governments to Rs 33.3 million. 
With other foreign finance significantly higher at Rs 241.2 million (27.3%) from 
previously negligible amounts in 1979, total foreign funding increased to Rs 309.1 
million (35%). With an overall requirement of Rs 882.2 million, domestic financing of 
Rs 573 million was necessary, the bulk of which was forthcoming from the monetary 
authority (Rs 398.1 million), though to a lesser degree than previously due to a com-
bined contribution from other general government and deposit money banks of Rs 
192.3 million (21.8% of total requirements). The actual deficit was virtually un-
changed at Rs 896.6 million in 1980, with the monetary authority continuing to pro-
vide Rs 366.5 million (40.9%) of total requirements, whilst domestic sources com-
bined to contribute Rs 679.4 million (75.8%). External sources fell to Rs 217.2 million 
(24.2%). Funding from IDI and foreign governments increased to Rs 134.3 million 
partially offsetting a sharp decline in other sources to Rs 84.2 million (only 9.4%). 
External finance was significantly higher again in 1981 at Rs 707.2 million 
(54.7%), with official foreign government flows higher at Rs 236.2 million (18.3%), 
and, in particular, other sources substantially higher at Rs 387 million (29.9%). 
Domestically, a net transfer of funds of Rs 139 million was made to the deposit money 
banks, whilst the monetary authority contributed Rs 592.8 million (45.8%) towards 
funding. No significant change in financing arrangements occurred in 1982, although 
deposit money banks did make a positive contribution of Rs 123.8 million (8.9%), al-
lowing that from the monetary authority to decline to Rs 470.2 million (33.9%). 
Subsequently, 1983 witnessed a significant change in financing structure as the deficit 
fell to Rs 1,160.1 million. Net external flows became negative as transfers were made 
to foreign governments of Rs 105.9 million and to other sources of Rs 195.2 million. 
The only positive contribution came fron IDIs at Rs 125.1 million (10.8%). Of the 
necessary Rs 1,335.1 million domestic funding, the majority was derived from deposit 
money banks (Rs 626 million (54%)). That from other general government and other 
financial institutions increased allowing a further fall in the contribution required from 
the monetary authority to Rs 319.8 million (27.6%). With the deficit reducing further 
to Rs 857.2 million in 1984, negative net flows to other external sources were sharply 
higher at Rs 541.3 million. However, increased official flows, via IDI, of Rs 294.6 
million and foreign governments of Rs 106.7 million partially offset this outflow. Of 
the necessary Rs 997.8 million domestic financing requirement, a flow to deposit 
money banks of Rs 18.5 million and decreased financing from other general govern-
ment necessitated increased finance from the monetary authority of Rs 661.8 million 
(77.2%). 
A substantial increase in external financing occurred in 1985, emanating from both 
official (Rs 545.6 million) and other sources (Rs 175.2 million). Combined external 
sources met 87.1% of the Rs 823.3 deficit. With other general government, deposit 
money bank and other domestic sources providing Rs 484.3 million of funds, flows to 
the monetary authority of Rs 352.1 million were possible. The year 1986 saw another 
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decline in the nominal deficit to Rs 640.2 million. With external flows becoming 
negative again (despite funding from foreign governments of Rs 155.3 million), due to 
net outflows to IDIs of Rs 37.1 million and to other sources of Rs 234.7 million, do-
mestic financing became prevalent. However, with other general government provid-
ing Rs 326.6 million, deposit money banks Rs 652.3 million, and others Rs 196.6 mil-
lion, further flows of Rs 379.5 million to the monetary authority were evident. 
Morocco (see Table A-6) 
After requiring financing equivalent ot 4% of GDP (dirham 1,384 million) in 1974, 
Morocco has consistently run a deficit in excess of 6% in the years under study. 
Indeed, in 1977, with the revenue share static at approximately 25% (dirham 12,333 
million) and expenditure rising to 40.2% (dirham 19,980 million) from 29.2% in 1974, 
the deficit had increased to 15.4% (dirham 7,647). With revenue static between 25 and 
26% through the rest of the period except 1981 and 1982 (when it was slightly higher 
at 26.6 and 27.1%, respectively), fluctuations in financing requirements have been due 
mainly to trends in expenditures. Indeed, the deficit fell to approximately 10% in 1979 
and 1980 in response to expenditure falling to 35.2%. The deficit subsequently in-
creased in 1981 to 13.8% (dirham 10,557 million) as expenditure peaked at 40.4% 
(dirham 30,975 million). By 1984, expenditure had fallen to 31.9% (dirham 33,446 
million) leading to a reduction in the deficit by more than half to 6.4% (dirham 6,762 
million). In 1985, however, increasing expenditures have led to a widening of the 
deficit to 7.9% (dirham 9,424 million). 
As regards financing of the deficit, Morocco appears to have been fortunate in being 
able to attract significant volumes of externally sourced finance, mostly from official 
sources. In 1974, domestic financing met dirham 1,163 million (86.3%) of the dirham 
1,348 million requirement. With flows to other general government of dirham 333 
million, domestic financing requirements were met by contributions of dirham 364 
million from the monetary authorities, dirham 426 million from deposit money banks 
and dirham 691 million from other financial institutions and the non-financial private 
sector combined. By 1977 external financing had become the major source of funding 
(a position it held for all years except 1983 and 1985), meeting dirham 5,195 (67.8%) 
of the vastly increased dirham 7,647 million requirement. Of this, foreign govern-
ments were the main contributor, providing dirham 4,109 million, with other external 
sources providing dirham 871 million. Domestic financing of dirham 2,452 million 
was met mainly by the monetary authorities (dirham 1,418 million or 18.5% of total 
requirements), as contributions from the deposit money banks and other financial insti-
tutions fell, whilst funding from the non-financial private sector increased significantly 
to dirham 531 million. 
There was a similar financing structure in 1979, though with other sources of exter-
nal finance becoming more important, meeting dirham 1,609 million (26.6%) of the 
dirham 6,039 million requirements, as net flows from foreign governments fell. Of 
domestic finance, that provided by the monetary authorities was lower at dirham 715 
million (11.8%), as contributions from other general government, deposit money 
banks and other financial institutions were significantly higher. Total external funding 
remained similar in 1980 at dirham 3,910 million (54.4%), though contributions from 
foreign governments increased with those from other external sources being 
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substantially lower at dirham 710 million. With increased requirements of dirham 
7,184 million a greater need for domestic financing appeared to materialize. With 
funds from other general goverment, deposit money banks and other sources falling in 
aggregate from 1979, that from the monetary authority increased significantly to 
dirham 2,040 million (28.4%). A substantial widening of the deficit to dirham 10,557 
million 1981 was met by increased external sources of dirham 7,116 million (67.4%), 
coming from increased foreign government and other foreign sources. With flows to 
other financial institutions and the non-financial private sector, domestic financing 
requirements of dirham 3,441 million were met by increased funding from deposit 
money banks and the monetary authority of dirham 1,319 million and dirham 2,469 
million, respectively. 
Despite increased net inflows from foreign governments of dirham 6,733 million in 
1982, a net outflow of funds to other sources of dirham 517 million from an inflow of 
dirham 2,829 million the previous year, led to a fall in external finance to dirham 
6,471 million (60.9%). With the deficit virtually unchanged at dirham 1,630 million, 
domestic finance necessarily increased. A substantial proportion, dirham 1,609 million 
(15.1%), came from the non-financial private sector, whilst the remainder came 
mainly from the monetary authorities (dirham 1,543 million) and deposit money banks 
(dirham 1,040 million). The year 1983 witnessed a reduced deficit of dirham 7,680 
million. External financing approximately halved to dirham 3,290 million (42.8%), 
despite increased funding from IDI and other sources as foreign government flows fell 
sharply to dirham 2,394 million. Therefore, domestic requirements increased to 
dirham 4,390 million. With net flows to other financial institutions amounting to 
dirham 672 million, and the non-financial private sector dirham 2,372 million, both 
deposit money banks and monetary authority contributions were higher at dirham 
3,382 million and dirham 3,321 million, respectively. 
With further increases in IDI funding to dirham 1,581 million, and a recovery in 
foreign government flows to dirham 3,694 million, external sources covered 79% of 
the reduced dirham 6,762 million deficit in 1984. Continued significant flows to other 
financial institutions, the non-financial private sector, domestic financing, though re-
duced to dirham 1,443 million, necessitated funding of dirham 841 million and dirham 
1,325 million from deposit money banks and the monetary authorities, respectively. 
The combination of reduced external funds (due mainly to lower flows from foreign 
governments) to dirham 4,506 million and an increased deficit of dirham 9,424 million 
led to an increase in domestic financing requirement to dirham 4,918 million (52.2%) 
in 1985. With dirham 4,444 million of this funded by deposit money banks and other 
domestic contributions totalling dirham 418 million, financing flows from the mone-
tary authority of only dirham 52 million were necessary. 
Sierra Leone (see Table A-7) 
The size of the central government sector has fallen significantly over the period. In 
1974 revenue stood at 19.2%. With expenditures standing at 23.6%, financing of 4.4% 
(Le 20.9 million) was required. By 1977, though expenditures had actually fallen to 
22.9%, revenues fell to a greater extent to 16% thus necessitating the financing of a 
greater deficit equivalent to 6.9% of GDP (Le 51 million). Revenue had fallen further 
to 15.3% of GDP by 1980. With expenditure rising to approximately 27%, the deficit 
peaked at 11.5% (Le 148.2 million). From 1980 to 1983 the revenue share fell to only 
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6.3% (Le 170.6 million). Meanwhile, expenditure fell to a low of 16.2% (Le 441.8 
million). Thus, after falling to 7.5% (Le 120.7 million) in 1981, the deficit rose again 
to stand at 9.9% (Le 271.2 million) in 1983. The same degree of financing relative to 
GDP was required in 1985 following a brief fall to 7.6% (Le 205.6 million) in 1984. 
This was due to revenues falling to 8.6% whilst expenditures rose to 18.5% of GDP. 
Since 1974, when they provided Le 13 million (62.2%) of the total Le 20.9 million 
requirement, external sources of finance have satisfied only a relatively small propor-
tion of the total financing requirements of Sierra Leone. Of domestic financing in 
1974, other financial institutions and the non-financial private sector provided Le 4.7 
million (23.2%), leaving the monetary authorities to provide Le 3.7 million banks' 
(18.2%). An increased requirement of Le 51 million in 1977 was met mainly by do-
mestic sources as external funding increased to only Le 14.7 million. Of the Le 36.3 
million provided domestically, deposit money banks' funding of Le 15.2 million re-
quired the monetary authority to supply Le 19.5 million (38.2%) of finance. With re-
quirements at Le 119 million in 1979, and external sources only slightly higher at Le 
38.3 million (32.2%), domestic flows were necessarily higher at Le 80.7 million. 
Provision of only Le 6.6 million from deposit money banks, other financial institutions 
and the private sector combined, required funding from the monetary authorities of Le 
74.1 (62.3%). 
From 1980, with deposit money banks, other financial institutions and the private 
sector combined providing relatively small amounts of finance, the majority of financ-
ing requirements were met by the monetary authorities, who in fact funded 58.2% of 
requirements in 1980, 83.1% in 1981, 87.6% in 1982 and 78.3% in 1983. In 1984, 
however, the contributions from the deposit money banks increased to Le 56.2 million 
(27.3%), and from other domestic sources to Le 40.8 million (19.8%), allowing a fall 
in the monetary authorities' contribution to Le 108.9 million (52.9%). This continued 
in 1985 with deposit money banks funding Le 132.9 million (35.4%) and others Le 
53.7 million (14.3%). With external financing peaking at Le 53.9 million (14.4%), a 
contribution of only Le 135.1 million (36%) was required from the monetary author-
ity. 
Tanzania (see Table A-8) 
The years of 1974, 1977, 1979 and 1980 saw revenues relatively static at 20% of 
GDP. With expenditure at 25.6% and 25.8%, respectively, in 1974 and 1977, financ-
ing of approximately 6% in both years was necessary. However, by 1979, expenditure 
had increased sharply to stand at 35.2%. Consequently the deficit was substantially 
higher at 14.8% of GDP. Subsequently, as the expenditure share fell to 28.7% in 1980, 
the deficit fell to 8.4%. In 1981, revenue rose faster than expenditure, leading to a fur-
ther cut in the deficit to 7%. Static expenditure and falling revenue widened the fi-
nancing requirement to approximately 9% in 1982, however. Continuing to 1984, a 
fall in the expenditure share to approximately 23.5% of GDP, despite revenue falling 
(to 18%), led to a reduction in the deficit to 5.5%. The deficit subsequently increased 
to 6% in 1985, however, as expenditure rose towards 25%, whilst revenue increased 
by a lesser degree. 
Deficit financing data for Tanzania are, unfortunately, very sketchy. Those that are 
available reveal that external finance from international development institutions and 
foreign governments combined met Sh 425 million (46.3%) of requirements in 1974. 
However, in 1979, such finance only accounted for Sh 729 million (13.6%) of the in-
creased Sh 5,376 million deficit.10 External finance had increased to Sh 847 million 
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(23.9%) in 1980 as the deficit fell to Sh 3,537 million. Figures for 1981 reveal that 
domestic financing of the Sh 3,667 million deficit, amounting to Sh 2,559 million 
(72.5%) was funded almost entirely by the monetary authority (Sh 2,575 million), as 
flows to other financial institutions and the non-financial private sector and an inflow 
of only Sh 240 million from the deposit money banks were evident.11 
Tunisia (see Table A-9) 
Clearly the size of the government sector has tended to increase over time. After 
standing at 26.6% in 1974, the revenue share had increased to 32% before levelling off 
and then rising again to stand at 36.8% in 1984. A financing requirement of only 1% 
resulted in 1974 after expenditure reached 27.6%. However, by 1977, this had in-
creased substantially to 6% after expenditure rose more rapidly than revenue to stand 
at 35.1% of GDP. The expenditure share continued to rise through to 1979, though to 
a lesser degree than revenue, thus leading to a diminished deficit of 4.7%. In 1980 and 
1981 expenditure fell to 35 and 34%, respectively. With revenue share static, financ-
ing requirements fell further to stand at 2.5% of GDP in 1981. Subsequently, in 1982 
and 1983, expenditure was significantly higher reaching a peak of 42.1% in 1983. 
Though revenue shares were also higher (34.5% in 1982, 33.7% in 1983), the deficit 
increased to 8.3% of GDP in 1983. Increased revenue and lower expenditure led to a 
narrowing of the deficit to approximately 5% in 1984. 
With regard to deficit financing, external finance of dinar 6.4 million contributed 
41.6% of the total dinar 15.4 million deficit. Of this, official international development 
institution (IDI) and foreign government flows were the primary source, overcoming a 
net outflow to other sources of dinar 1.4 million. Of dinar 9 million domestic financ-
ing, net flows to non-financial public enterprise of dinar 1.8 million and contributions 
of only dinar 2.5 million from deposit money banks necessitated a dinar 8.3 million 
(53.6%) contribution from the monetary authority. By 1977 external finance from for-
eign governments and others had increased substantially to dinar 38.6 million and di-
nar 53.6 million, respectively, to bring total external finance to dinar 95.8 million 
(72.5%). Of the dinar 36.4 million domestic requirement, net flows from public en-
terprise of dinar 28.9 million, deposit money banks of dinar 2.7 million and other gen-
eral government of dinar 17.1 million allowed a flow to the monetary authority of di-
nar 12.4 million. External finance had increased further in 1979 to dinar 136.8 million 
(through increased IDI contributions of dinar 10.0 million, foreign government of di-
nar 48.6 million and other sources dinar 78.1 million), to finance 98% of the deficit. 
With flows from other financial institutions, non-financial public enterprise and the 
private sector of dinar 30.4 million combined, notwithstanding a net flow to the de-
posit money banks of dinar 21.5 million, funding of only 5.7 million was necessary 
from the monetary authority. 
Inflows from abroad of dinar 80.4 million financed 98.9% of total financing re-
quirements in 1980. With dinar 53 million of funding from the deposit money banks, 
other financial institutions, public enterprise and the private sector combined, a net 
flow of funds to the monetary authority of dinar 34.5 million was possible. With a 
slightly increased deficit of dinar 105.5 million in 1981, external finance of dinar 
108.7 million, mainly from official sources, allowed net flow to domestic sources of 
dinar 3.2 million. Funds from deposit money banks of dinar 58.9 million permitted net 
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flows to the monetary authority, public enterprise, and the public sector of dinar 50.4 
million, dinar 1.4 million, and 5.5 million, respectively. 
There was a sharp increase in the deficit in 1982 to dinar 277.4 million, 70.7% of 
which was financed from foreign sources, with, in particular, other foreign sources in-
creasing their funding to dinar 76.7 million. Of domestic finance, a large contribution 
from the deposit money banks (dinar 64.3 million) and other financial institutions 
(dinar 62.7 million), allowed continued flows to the monetary authorities, public en-
terprise and the private sector. A similar structure was evident in 1983 as the deficit 
increased to dinar 458.8 million. External finance provided dinar 284.1 million 
(61.9%), of which other non-official sources increased to dinar 145.1 million. A fur-
ther large contribution from the deposit money banks (dinar 50.6 million) and other fi-
nancial institutions allowed net flows to the monetary authority and public enterprise. 
External financing was sharply lower in 1984 (as non-official other sources fell to 
dinar 6.7 million) at dinar 146.8 million, providing finance for only 47.8% of the re-
duced deficit of dinar 307.3 million. With financing of dinar 70.8 million from other 
financial institutions, dinar 73.5 million from deposit money banks, only dinar 12.4 
million of funds was required from the monetary authority. 
Uganda (see Table A-10) 
After standing at approximately 9.5%, due to expenditure running at 17% and revenue 
at 7.5%, Uganda's deficit fell to stand at only 2.5% following a sharp fall in expendi-
ture to 9.5% in excess of the fall in revenue to 7% of GDP. In 1979 and 1980, the 
deficit narrowed to 3% with both revenue and expenditure falling in 1979 before level-
ling off in 1980. With revenue falling in 1981 to 2% of GDP and expenditure sharply 
higher at 9% the deficit grew substantially to 7%. Following 1981, expenditure con-
tinued to rise to stand at 14% in 1982 and 1983. Revenue increased at a faster rate, 
however, in both these years so that by 1983 the financing requirement had decreased 
to less than 3%. In 1984 revenue was once again higher at 14%. However, expenditure 
had increased to stand at a peak of 17.5%. Consequently, the deficit widened to 3.5%. 
A further rise to 5% resulted in 1985 as revenue fell relatively more than expenditure. 
In 1986, this trend was reversed, leading to a slight fall in financing requirements. 
Financing data reveal the extent to which Uganda has had to rely on domestic 
sources of finance to cover central government's excess expenditure. In 1980, external 
financing of Sh 0.46 million met only 1.2% of the Sh 19.1 million requirement. Of the 
Sh 39 million domestic financing requirement, funds of Sh 9 million from the deposit 
money banks and Sh 2.7 million from others necessitated Sh 27.3 million (69.8%) of 
finance from the monetary authority. The financing structure was virtually identical in 
1981. In 1982, reliance on the monetary authority was lessened as contributions from 
the deposit money banks and others increased to Sh 63.2 million and Sh 10.9 million, 
respectively, financing together 50.8% of the Sh 145 million requirement. Sh 73.8 mil-
lion (50.6%) of funding was required from the monetary authority.12 
In 1983, external sources financed Sh 14.7 million (11%) of the Sh 133.8 million 
requirement. Sh 172.1 million of financing was required from the monetary authority, 
as net flows to the deposit money banks amounted to Sh 67.1 million, and other do-
mestic sources combined provided only Sh 15 million. Subsequently, in 1984, a net 
external outflow of Sh 7.5 million was evident, necessitating domestic financing of 
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Sh 229.2 million in order to fund the Sh 221.2 million deficit.13 With Sh 260.4 million 
raised from other financial institutions, public-sector enterprise and the private sector, 
net flows to the monetary authority and the deposit money banks of Sh 26 million and 
Sh 5.2 million, respectively, were evident. In 1985 external sources were significantly 
higher at Sh 134.7 million, funding 21% of the Sh 640.2 million requirement. With a 
large net flow to public enterprise of Sh 55.8 million and only a small contribution 
from other domestic sources, financing of Sh 536.3 million from the monetary author-
ity was necessary. 
Zaire (see Table A-l 1) 
A large financing requirement of 17.6% was evident in 1974, with expenditure stand-
ing at 49.7% and revenue standing at 32.1%. By 1977, expenditure had fallen greatly 
to 32.3%. With revenue falling to a lesser extent to 21.9%, the deficit narrowed to 
11.4%. By 1979, expenditure had fallen again to 27.1% whilst revenue had actually 
increased to stand at 22.1%. Thus, the deficit declined further to stand at 4.9% of 
GDP. With revenue increasing further in 1980, comparatively more so than expendi-
ture, the financing requirement fell to 1.9%. Subsequently, 1981 and 1982 saw declin-
ing revenue shares and rising expenditures leading to an increased deficit that had 
reached 11.2% by 1982. Sharply falling expenditure in 1983 and stagnant revenue led 
to a sharp reduction of the deficit to only 2.8%. This remained virtually unchanged in 
1984 as expenditure and revenue shares grew sharply in line, while 1985 and 1986 
witnessed the development of a surplus as expenditures fell back to approximately 
28% by 1986. In 1985 revenue rose to 35%, leading to a surplus of approximately 6% 
of GDP. 
Data on the sources of funding for Zaire's central government deficit were available 
only up to 1983. In 1974, however, external sources provided zaire 118.5 million 
(36.5%) of the finance required to meet the zaire 324 million deficit. Of the remaining 
domestic finance, a provision of only zaire 13.2 million from the deposit money banks 
and the net financial flows to the other financial institutions of zaire 1.1 million, ne-
cessitated a zaire 193.7 million (59.7%) financing flow from the monetary authorities. 
With an increased requirement of zaire 449.6 million, the structure of financing was 
similar in 1977. However, in 1979, external sources, falling to Zaire 63.7 million, met 
only 11.6% of the zaire 548.6 million requirement. Domestic funding of zaire 484.9 
million was met almost entirely by the monetary authorities (zaire 477.9 million or 
87.1%). With lower requirements of zaire 331.6 million in 1980, increased external 
sources of zaire 126.1 million provided 38% of funds. With a net flow of zaire 32.8 
million to other financial institutions and a minimal contribution from the deposit 
money banks, the monetary authority once again provided the bulk of finance amount-
ing to zaire 235.7 million. 
External finance rose again to zaire 722.3 million (33.5%) in 1981 as the deficit in-
creased to zaire 2,157 million. Again the monetary authority provided the bulk of 
funds (zaire 1,485 million). With external sources falling to zaire 276.3 million 
(7.9%), the increased deficit of zaire 3,484 million in 1982 was financed almost en-
tirely by the monetary authority (zaire 3,246.8 million or 93.2% of total requirements). 
Subsequently, a substantial external outflow of zaire 867.2 million in 1983, and con-
tinued flows to the deposit money banks and other financial institutions (totalling zaire 
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41.1 million) led to the monetary authority providing zaire 2,561.6 million of funds in 
the face of a zaire 1,653 deficit requirement. 
Zambia (see Table A-12) 
A surplus of 3.4% of GDP was apparent in 1974, with revenue standing at 34.4% and 
expenditure at 31% of GDP. Revenue had declined to 23.3% in 1979 and fluctuated 
between 22 and 26% for the rest of the period. Meanwhile expenditure rose to 40% by 
1977, thus necessitating financing of 13.2%. Although subsequently falling to 9.1% in 
1979, due to decreased expenditures, the deficit increased again to 18.5% in 1980 as 
expenditure reached 44.3% of GDP. Though falling to 13% in 1981 as the expenditure 
share fell, the deficit rose again to 18.6% due to increased expenditure. With expendi-
ture sharply lower in 1983 and 1984 the deficit fell to approximately 8%. More re-
cently, in 1985, increased expenditure did lead to a further sharp rise in financing re-
quirements to 14.9%. 
Focusing on the structure of financing after the surplus of kwacha 64.4 million in 
1974, external sources contributed only kwacha 19 million (7.3%) to the total re-
quirement of kwacha 261.4 million in 1977. A net inflow of kwacha 24.2 million from 
international development institutions was the main source of these funds, offsetting 
net outflows to foreign governments and other (non-official) sources. With deposit 
money banks providing kwacha 250.3 million and other financial institutions kwacha 
36.8 million, a net flow of funds to the monetary authority (of kwacha 21.1 million) 
and to the non-financial private sector was possible. External financing had increased 
to kwacha 137.5 million (57%) in 1979 to meet a reduced requirement of kwacha 
241.1 million. In 1980, this had increased further in nominal terms to provide kwacha 
296.6 million (47.5%) towards the increased deficit of kwacha 567.5 million.14 
External finance fell slightly in 1981 to kwacha 247.4 million with foreign govern-
ments providing, on balance, kwacha 240 million and IDIs kwacha 14.8 million, off-
setting a net outflow to other sources of kwacha 7.5 million. This was equivalent to 
54.9% of the total requirement of kwacha 449.6 million. Of domestic financing, flows 
to deposit money banks of kwacha 163.4 million necessitated kwacha 283 million of 
financing from the monetary authority despite a net flow from other financial institu-
tions of kwacha 97 million. With external financing lower at kwacha 111.6 million 
(16.7%) in 1982, an increased deficit required a large increase in the degree of domes-
tic financing. This was, in the main, provided by the monetary authority (kwacha 357 
million) and the deposit money banks (kwacha 218.1 million). 
In 1983, external funding was virtually unchanged at kwacha 119.9 million (36.6%) 
in nominal absolute terms. A significantly reduced deficit of kwacha 327.3 million re-
quired substantially less domestic finance. A net flow to the deposit money banks of 
kwacha 45.4 million was offset by contributions from the monetary authority (kwacha 
146.6 million) and other sources.15 The increased deficit of kwacha 413.7 million in 
1984 required increased domestic financing, as funds from abroad increased only 
slightly to kwacha 129.3 million (31.3%). With funding from the deposit money banks 
of kwacha 123.5 million and other sources of kwacha 121.7 million, a fall in the re-
quirements from the monetary authority was evident. 
External finance was substantially higher at kwacha 599.7 million or 57% of re-
quirements in 1985, due to increased flows from IDIs (kwacha 382.9 million) and for-
eign governments (kwacha 199.8 million). Remaining finance from domestic sources 
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was forthcoming mainly from deposit money banks (kwacha 384.5 million or 36.5% 
of total requirements). With other sources providing kwacha 8.5 million, only kwacha 
59.9 million was required from the monetary authority. 
Zimbabwe (see Table A- l3) 
After standing at 4.3% in 1977, with revenue at 26.2% and expenditure at 30.5%, 
Zimbabwe's deficit had increased to 10.5% of GDP by 1980 due to subsequent in-
creases in the expenditure share in 1979 and 1980 and a fall in the revenue share in 
1979. By 1981, with revenue higher at 25.5% and expenditure lower at 31.4%, financ-
ing equivalent to 5.9% of GDP was necessary. However, this had risen to 10.5% by 
1982 as expenditure rose sharply to reach 40.5% of GDP. With revenue continuing to 
rise, reaching 30.8% in 1983 and expenditure falling back to 37.2% the deficit fell to 
6.4%. In 1984, rising expenditure, peaking at 41.2%, led to an increased deficit. In 
1985, however, the deficit had fallen back to 7.4% as expenditure fell to a greater de-
gree than revenue. 
With respect to financing, a net external inflow of only $2.6 million necessitated 
domestic financing of $98 million to meet a deficit of $95.4 million in 1977. In 1979, 
external funds had increased substantially to $121.4 (41.4% of total requirements), re-
quiring that domestic financing increase only to $172 million to meet an enlarged 
deficit of $293.4 million. With financing requirements increased, however, to $376 
million in 1980, lower external inflow of $78.9 million required a greater increase in 
domestic financing to $297.1 million (79%). An increase in external financing to $146 
(55.8%), coupled with a lower deficit of $261.6 million, led to a lower demand for 
domestic financing. With net financial flows to deposit money banks of $112.2 mil-
lion, and contributions from other domestic sources of $152.1 million, funding of 
$75.7 million (28.9%) from the monetary authority was necessary. 
As the deficit widened sharply to $545.3 million in 1982 and external financing to 
$131.8 million, domestic finance would appear to have been placed under greater 
pressure. With deposit money banks providing $25.4 million, other financial institu-
tions, public enterprise and the private sector combined providing $145.9 million, re-
quirements from the enterprise and the private sector combined providing $145.9 mil-
lion, requirements from the monetary authority stood at $242.2 million (44.4%). 
External funding fell to $43.5 million in 1983, with the bulk of $33.8 million being 
provided by other non-official sources. This combined with a contribution of $14.6 
million from the IDIs to offset a net outflow of $4.9 million to foreign governments. 
Domestic financing of $350.2 (89%) was required to meet a lower deficit of $393.7 
million. Other financial institutions and the private sector provided the majority of this 
at $287.7 million. With a net flow of funds to deposit money banks, finance of $71.7 
million (18.2%) was required from the monetary authority. 
External finance was significantly higher at $322.1 million in 1984 due to an in-
crease in other non-official sources to $266.6 million and IDI sources to $56.2 million. 
Domestic finance consequently fell to $325.3 million (50.2%) despite an increased 
deficit of $647.4 million.16, and 1985 again witnessed an increase in external funds 
with other non-official sources increasing to $416.6 million, foreign government 
sources to $35.2 million and IDI sources to $65.5 million. Overall, these sources fi-
nanced 82.5% of requirements, allowing a net flow of funds to the monetary authority 
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of $269.7 million, as contributions from deposit money banks stood at $10.6 million, 
whilst those from other sources increased to $364.2 million. 
Notes to appendix 
1. Figures for the composition of revenues and expenditures, and the financing em-
ployed to meet the resulting requirements are presented in Tables A-l to A-13, 
and have been extracted from Government Financial Statistics (GFS), 1987. For 
Kenya, in particular, the January 1989 issue of International Financial Statistics 
reveals that these have been substantially revised (aggregates only). The Figure for 
Kenya, therefore, uses the updated aggregates. However, financing, revenue and 
expenditure breakdowns were not available. Therefore, for the purposes of consis-
tency, the 1987 data from GFS are published in Table A-3, and alluded to in the 
text. 
2. Unfortunately, data revealing a breakdown of the general sources/destinations of 
external flows were not available for Ghana. 
3. Domestically, as stated in the paper, the government can enforce financing from 
the financial sector through sales of debt to the domestic money banks and other 
financial sector or reserve requirements, if it cannot sell enough bonds to the pri-
vate sector. Failing this, finance can be procured straight from the monetary au-
thority. Although not strictly true, finance from this source is considered to fund 
residual requirements. 
4. Financing requirements actually fell as a percentage of GDP to 2.7%. 
5. Data on the sources of the domestic financing component were not available. 
6. Financing flows from international development institutions and foreign govern-
ments have been termed "official" flows, whilst "other" sources, which include 
long- and short-term foreign bonds, bank loans (and other loans) and advances 
from foreigners, and supplier credits, are considered as "non-official" private 
flows of finance. 
7. It should be noted that data for 1986 and 1987 are still provisional. 
8. In fact equivalent to 9.5% of total financing requirements for that year. 
9. "Other" includes other financial institutions and the non-financial private and 
public sectors. 
10. Data revealing the sources of external and domestic finance were not available. 
11. Sh 94 million of financing was unclassified in this year. 
12. A slight net outflow of funds to external sources (1.4%) was also evident in 1982. 
13. Figures may not reconcile completely due to adjustments in the accounts. These 
amounted to Sh 0.5 million in this year. 
14. No data on the sources of these external funds were available. 
15. This includes other financial institutions and the non-financial private sector. 
16. A detailed breakdown of domestic finance sources was not available. 
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Figure A. Deficit trends in selected African countries 
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Figure A. continued 
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Figure A. continued 
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Figure A. continued 
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Research issues 
1. Undertake in-depth calculations of the manner in which various exogenous fac-
tors have impacted on fiscal deficits in particular countries. How do the magni-
tudes compare with those coming from more controllable influences? See also is-
sues in Section V. 
2. Numerically assess the recurrent and capital transfers visibly made from the gov-
ernments of individual countries to their state enterprises. Then attempt to con-
struct the orders of magnitude of the immediate or longer term fiscal burden as-
sociated with the less transparent forms of government support to the enterprises. 
Evaluate the social rate of return of the total of these forms of assistance. 
3. Assess the magnitude of the rediscounts and guarantees made available by cen-
tral banks in individual countries and analyse the main reasons for these. How 
well were they integrated with the main budgetary objectives of the government? 
4. Try to assess the true magnitude of the budgetary dependence on external financ-
ing of individual countries, taking account not only of the government's direct 
borrowing but also of the indirect responsibilities for private debt which some 
governments have taken on. What has been the evolving structure and cost of this 
dependence? 
5. Describe the range of controls on interest rates maintained by individual govern-
ments, and assess the adequacy of the rates offered on the main classes of gov-
ernment paper, relative both to prevailing and expected inflation rates and to the 
alternatives which larger domestic savers are actually using, e.g. capital flight 
and investment in real assets such as land. 
6. Possibly on a survey basis, estimate the proportions of government domestic 
"expenditures" of the last few years which have not actually been paid to suppli-
ers. Examine the various ways in which these non-payments arise and how they 
relate to the government's mechanisms for expenditure control. Assess also the 
types of economic responses of the main suppliers to the arrears of payment. 
7. Compute the magnitudes of the five methods of financing just described and 
identify any emerging trends in their relative importance. How important are they 
in particular countries relative to external borrowing and the use of the inflation 
tax? 
8. For many African countries research is certainly needed regarding the magnitude 
of the relevant elasticities and so the degree of diversion of private-sector financ-
ing associated with any given increase in public-sector deficits. Try to assess the 
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applicability of econometric methods for estimating these elasticities in particular 
countries, as well as the possible alternative approaches which could be used. On 
the basis of elasticity estimates, assess the relative magnitude of the direct and 
indirect effects of a unit increase in the deficit on external borrowing. 
9. Estimate the parameters of the money-demand equation for individual countries 
and/or evaluate the money-demand equations which have already been estimated. 
Using these, calculate the maximum revenue which the governments can realisti-
cally expect to collect from the inflation tax, as well as the sensitivity of these 
amounts to slight changes in key parameters. Assess these results against actual 
and prospective inflation rates and evaluate the magnitude of revenue losses 
which would be associated with reduced inflation. 
10. Assess the shape of the supply curve of foreign finance for individual countries 
in so far as this is identifiable from the experiences of recent years. How has this 
changed in the 1980s as compared to the 1970s, and at what annual volume of 
gross transfers does the flat portion represented by access to concessional fund-
ing end? How does this relate in amounts to the financing needs of the govern-
ment? 
11. Evaluate the evidence regarding capital flight from individual countries, and 
assess the extent to which this might be explained in terms of arguments of the 
Ricardian equivalence type. 
12. Implement a model of the Mathieson and McKinnon (1981) type for particular 
countries and assess the shape of the trade-off between reserve requirements and 
inflation for a particular level of the government deficit. 
13. Implement a Fry-style model for particular countries and assess both the limits of 
government deficits which are consistent with different targeted inflation rates, 
and the way in which these limits can be redefined if controls on interest rates are 
relaxed. 
14. What is the shape of the trade-off between inflation and the current account in 
particular countries? On the basis of some of the earlier research questions which 
have been posed, do the assumptions in the Corden paper necessary to generate 
that trade-off seem to be applicable in particular African countries? 
15. By reference to detailed work within individual banks, assess the true level of 
non-performing and bad loans in the banks, and how these compare with the cap-
ital of those same banks. Assess the main causes of the build-up of the bad debt 
portfolio and use this to identify the changes in economic policies and in bank 
management necessary to prevent a further major build-up of the problem. Do 
the factors that affect the domestic banks have any overlap with causes of non-
payment of external loans? 
16. (This Research Issue continues the previous one.) Identify and quantify the vari-
ous ways in which the authorities, the banks and others involved have responded 
to bad debts in the banking system and calculate both the transparent effect of 
such responses on government deficits, and some of the other less direct ways in 
which they have inflated government financial requirements (e.g. through 
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extensive use of rediscounting). 
17. Examine the micro-level behaviour of the banks in particular countries where the 
problem of bad debts is severe. How far do the portfolio choices of the banks de-
part from what might be construed as "sound" behaviour, and what main ele-
ments within the decision-making process in banks can be shown to account for 
this? 
18. Recalibrate the Mathieson and McKinnon (1981) model referred to in the previ-
ous section to assess the magnitude of this particular problem vis a vis that aris-
ing from reserve requirements. 
19. Review the literature on solutions to financial sector distress which is available in 
relation to other parts of the world. Assess which aspects of established "good 
practice" would and would not be applicable in particular African countries. 
20. A careful accounting study for selected countries of the extent to which the gov-
ernment is a buyer and/or a beneficiary of the sales of tradeable goods. This 
should reveal the balance of advantage for the government itself from devalua-
tion and also suggest policy reforms which could make a government's vested 
interest in avoiding devaluations less acute. 
21. A major project on this set of issues in several African countries designed to 
identify possible general propositions for the continent. 
22. Build on the work already suggested in Section II to provide a full documenta-
tion of the various ways in which particular African governments have inter-
vened to repress financial-sector development. Assess the extent to which this 
can be traced to the need to finance public deficits at low cost. 
23. Assemble quantitative evidence on the various components of credit demand 
which would materialize if interest rates were freed and nominal rates moved to 
higher levels. On the basis of the present expenditure and taxation policies of 
particular governments, what would be the cost of these higher interest rates from 
the viewpoint of the size of the deficits to be financed? What would the further 
consequences be, for example, on inflation? 
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Notes 
1. An important exception to this general tendency is Ghana where civil-service 
reform needed both a retrenchment of staff and a major rise in wage rates to 
redress the situation that found a majority of civil servants in 1983 needing to 
spend up to eight times their official salaries to provide a basic consumption 
basket for their families. 
2. These are Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Gabon and Nigeria. 
3. Non-grant revenues in SSA declined from 20.5 percent of GDP in 1980-1983 
to 19.6 percent of GDP by 1987. 
4. However, it should be noted that since 1980 only 12 SSA countries have 
regularly serviced their debts, and that between 1980 and 1988, 25 SSA 
countries rescheduled their debts with creditors a total of 99 times. 
5. Although negative real rates have occurred in some years. 
6. These issues are discussed at some length in the context of a formal model in 
Mathieson and McKinnon, 1981. 
7. An interesting example in Uganda in the early 1970s involved a major brewing 
company refusing to pay its duties on the grounds that the government had 
failed to pay for the beer supplied to the army. 
8. Here interpreted as direct sales of government securities to the central bank. 
9. Estimate the parameters of the money-demand equation for individual countries 
and/or evaluate the money-demand equations which have already been 
estimated. Using these, calculate the maximum revenue which the governments 
can realistically expect to collect from the inflation tax, as well as the sensitivity 
of these amounts to slight changes in key parameters. Assess these results 
against actual and prospective inflation rates and evaluate the magnitude of 
revenue lossess which would be associated with reduced inflation. This is 
argued more fully in Aghevli and Khan, 1977, and more recently in Tanzi, 
1988. 
10. Interest-rate ceilings, for example, serve both to keep down the apparent cost of 
the government's own borrowing and to reduce the attractiveness of private-
sector assets in portfolios relative to the debt of the government. 
11. For example, in a very repressed economy where the money:GDP ratio was 
only about 15 percent—a not uncommonly low figure in Africa—a deficit at the 
present African average of about 8 percent of GDP would probably imply 
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inflation at a rate of about 50 percent if the deficit was financed entirely on an 
inflationary basis. 
12. By the end of 1988, this had benefited just five low-income African coutries. 
13. Presumably, most debtor and creditor countries aspire to restore a situation 
whereby a significant part of external transfers can be made on something close 
to market terms. Long-term dependence on large concessional funds is an 
uncomfortable prospect. 
14. A good example of this was in Ghana in the mid-1960s when the NLC 
government's adjustment policies were widely criticized for failing to repudiate 
the debts built up by the previous Nkrumah regime (see Nelson, 1983). 
15. The obvious negative incentive effect coming from debt forgiveness is that 
associated with moral hazard. 
16. In the numerical example referred to earlier, both rates were set at 25 percent. 
17. A more sophisticated model which covers much of the same ground is in 
Easterly, 1988. 
18. The presumption of his paper is that the rate of inflation will increase to 
generate this result. However, this presupposes that the economy is still 
operating in a range where a higher rate of the tax can, indeed, generate 
enlarged revenues (i.e. it is not too severely financially repressed). 
19. The analysis here does not explicitly discuss the fact that government financing 
using securities which carry a "realistic" interest rate can have major 
consequences for the size of the fiscal deficit when inflationary expectations 
and nominal interest rates are high. Lower inflation in these circumstances can 
lower the nominal deficit itself and not merely amend the methods of financing. 
20. Data in World Bank and UNDP, 1989, show that in 13 African countries 
undertaking reform in the 1980s, the total number of public enterprises 
liquidated was only 78, with 52 more under way. No information is available 
regarding the size of these. 
21. For example, the understatement of bad debts which distorts the balance sheet 
of banks or the booking of interest on those debts which distorts the operating 
account. 
22. See, for example, Ricardo Pascale, Opening Address to EDI Conference on 
Financial Systems and Policies, Punte del Este, Uruguay, December 1988. 
23. Casual evidence suggests that the number of actual bank failures in Africa in 
recent years has been small. 
24. This point, and the discussion in the earlier part of the paper, suggest that a 
government's deficit in present circumstances in Africa might be represented as 
having three main components, namely (i) the "normal" deficit associated with 
the normal level of provision of government services, (ii) the crisis element 
associatied with bailouts of, and supports to, financially distressed companies 
and banks, and (iii) the adjustment element, being the extra fiscal burden of 
adjustment programmes. 
25. It can be noted that governments which control, for example, petroleum and 
food imports can avoid the fiscal consequences of devaluation by passing the 
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higher costs through to consumers. The decision as to whether or not to do this 
is essentially a decision about whether the reduced real incomes associated with 
adjustment in the short term should fall on users of specific products or on the 
taxpayer more generally. The soft option is to choose the latter approach. 
26. This proposition has recently been argued in relation to the caution about the 
active use of the exchange rate in Eastern Europe; see Nuti, 1988. 
27. Hansen and Neal, 1984, provide several examples of this from Africa and 
elsewhere. For example, nominal interest rates in Nigeria in the period 1970-
1982 ranged from 4 to 6 at the same time as inflation moved as high as 70 
percent. 
28. The Southern Cone reforms of the late 1970s provide the most dramatic 
illustrations of this point; see also Roe, 1988. 
29. That is, companies for which the real rate of return was temporarily below the 
real rate of interest. This is a phenomenon which was widely observed in the 
latter stages of the Southern Cone reforms; see Hansen and de Melo, 1983. 
30. A related point is the exchange rate at which remittances from overseas migrant 
workers can be brought into the country. If these payments attract the less 
favourable (i.e. overvalued) exchange rate, as in Sudan, then the incentive for 
them to come, if at all, through parallel underground markets, will be strong. 
31. Of course, the issue in repressed financial markets is not so much the total size 
of domestic savings as the part of this which is placed in financial instruments 
which the government could possibly tap, rather than in inflation hedges and in 
foreign banks. While deficits are high, the nominal interest rates which would 
have to be paid to divert substantially more domestic savings into domestic 
financial instruments would normally be prohibitively high. 
32. A form of triple jeopardy in taxation of profits is not uncommon in developing 
country tax systems, i.e. (i) taxation of corporate profits, (ii) taxation of 
dividend distributions, and (iii) taxation of incomes in the hand of private 
shareholders. 
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